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INTRODUCTION
The election year 1912 began not differently from most election
years. The Incumbent Republicans started to survey for the public the
administration of William Howard Taft and to extol his virtues as
President, The office-hungry Democrats, seeking to end sixteen years
on the presidential sidelines, began increasing their criticism of Taft
and his administration. Both major parties, as well as several minor
ones, began to look around for strong candidates capable of winning the
national vote in November. By mid-year, the Democrats could see a
battle in the making, and when they convened in Baltimore they were not
disappointed.

It was not until the forty-sixth ballot that Woodrow Wilson

was able to swing enough votes from House Speaker Champ Clark to secure
the nomination. Wilson's platform was progressive.
All was not well within the Republican ranks, however, and the
forces were already afoot which would make this election year memorable.
As early as 1911, ex-President Theodore Roosevelt had displayed some
concern over the policies of Taft, and by the early months of 1912 he
had declared his intention to be a candidate. The Republican Party was
somewhat bound to stay with Taft, however, and there seemed to be little
doubt that he would receive the nomination at Chicago in June. As
convention time approached, the two former friends became bitter enemies.
The Taft-controlled convention gave him the nomination easily, and the
embattled Roosevelt stormed out—taking his supporters with him. He was
duly nominated by his Progressive "Bull Moose" Party in August, and the
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die was casto

i

Not surprisingly, the Republican split eased Wilson into

office by a handy margin of both electoral and popular votes. Taft
came in a poor third, carrying only two states with eight electoral
votes o
The purpose of this study is to determine why, in the light of
local conditions and problems, Utah (the other state was Vermont) chose
to support President Taft. Why did Utah prefer the conservative policies
of this nationally unpopular figure, while the rest of the nation favored
the progressivism of Wilson or the progressivism of Roosevelt? What were
the national issues which affected Utah? Who exercised political control
in the state? What was the party alignment? How important was newspaper
opinion? To what extent was personal friendship for Taft, on the part of
local Republican leaders, a factor?

Did a recent outbreak of Mormon-non-

Mormon friction in Utah politics influence the outcome? These are
indicative of the questions to be answered in this study.

CHAPTER I

THE NATIONAL SCENE
The election of 1912 was hailed as a victory for those progressive elements in and out of politics which had been becoming more
insistent with the years. The Greenback Labor Party of the 1870's, the
Farmers' Alliance of the 1880's, and the Populists of the 1890's were
the forerunners—with their demands for social, labor, and political
reforms. With the turn of the century, these demands came more frequently. Many individuals set themselves to expose the evils of big
business, the horrors of the slums, the miserable conditions under which
most laborers worked, and the corrupt influences in the Government.
Writers of note attacked bitterly these and other areas where reform was
needed. The trusts, governmental control by big business, scandals in
food and drug processing and manufacturing, child labor, etc.—each was
exposed in damning detail in the national press and in best-selling
novels.
Theodore Roosevelt, while not the originator of this movement,
was sympathetic to it and used the power of his office to support it.
Much badly-needed legislation was passed during his years as President,
including the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Meat Inspection Act. However, because of the business influence over Congress, the reformers
were able to achieve greater success on the state and local levels.
Cities made progress in sanitation, housing, public health, and in
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freeing city government from outside control. White-collar workers began
joining with the farmers in demanding relief from abuses.
On the state level, Wisconsin, under the fiery Robert M.
LaFollette, showed the way. Other states were not slow to follow.
Shortly, under the onslaught of crusading progressives, the trusts and
influence peddlers were forced to relinquish their strangle holds on
state after state. New methods were devised to assure continuing public
control of the processes of government. These methods included the
initiative, the referendum, and the recall—each of which made the public
the final judge of legislation. The secret ballot was introduced and
anti-graft laws passed. Such was the course of progressivism.
By 1912 much had been done; but to the militant progressive, much
remained to be done. He sought to obtain on the national level the reforms
which had been achieved in the more enlightened states. The demands of
an aroused citizenry thus set the stage for the campaign and election of
1912.
It will be useful here to outline the development of progressivism in the two major parties prior to, and during, 1912. As indicated
above, Teddy Roosevelt was President when the tidal wave of reform first
began to break in earnest on the national scene. He lent his support
to It and used it to his own advantage. He became extremely popular as
the champion of reform; and, even though his party was basically conservative and had long been the friend of business and the "interests," he
was able to bring about Important changes. Perhaps his greatest appeal
to the public lay in his reputation as a trust-buster. The long-idle
Sherman Anti-trust Act was brought out and used with frequency.
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Effective laws were passed to control the railroads, A Department of
Commerce and Labor was formed, with a Bureau of Corporations. The latter
was extremely useful in investigating and cracking down on monopolies
and helped to pave the way for the era of "trust-busting." Roosevelt
considered conservation to be a part of the fight against encroaching
big business and was an ardent and enthusiastic conservationist. Shocked
by the enormous waste in national resources, he closed thousands of acres
to commercial use.
In spite of his accomplishments, Roosevelt as a reformer may have
been overrated by the public. Thomas A. Bailey says of hims
He was clearly a progressive with the brakes on, and his reputation
as a reformer was inflated. . . . But in his defense one must note
that he was confronted by a conservative, unsympathetic, and often
hostile Congress. . . ,1
He adds, however, that one of Roosevelt's important contributions as
President was that "he helped to direct and make respectable the
P rog re s s i ve movement."*
Roosevelt, satisfied with the start he had made, chose William
Howard Taft to carry out his policies, and used his personal prestige to
get him nominated and elected. Then, at the age of fifty, he withdrew
from the scene.
Taft had some progressive sympathies, but he was no crusader.
Although he did aid the cause of reform, notably by attacking some important trusts, this fact was greatly outweighed, in the minds of the
progressives, by his other actions. Upon becoming President, he chose

^Thomas A. Bailey, The American Pageant; A History of the
Republic (Bostons D, C. Heath and Co., 1956), p„""669.
2

Ibid.
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as advisors a group of ardent Old Guard party members noted for their
conservativeness—-and their reputation soon became his. The first
serious flare-up concerned the tariff, which came to be a key issue in
1912,

The 1908 Republican platform had pledged a revision of the exist-

ing tariff, but the responsible party leaders in Congress took no action.
In 1909, Taft called a special session of Congress for this purpose. The
result was the much-criticized Payne-Aldrich Bill. While purporting to
end the tariff problem, it made few substantial reductions in rates,
and in many cases even raised them. The bulk of the dutiable list was
left unchanged.

It did, however, contain provisions for a Tariff Board,

something Taft very much wanted. Although the Bill fell far short of
his expectations, Taft signed it as being better than nothing and to
secure the Tariff Board, His critics, angered by his signing, were further antagonized later when, in justifying his action, he statd publicly
that "I think the Payne Tariff Bill is the best tariff bill that the
Republican Party ever passed. . . ."3

Senators from the Wheat Belt, led

by LaFollette, attempted to defeat the bill. Although unsuccessful, they
did manage to convince much of the nation that it had been betrayed.

Of

the event, DeWitt says, "It was the tariff session of 1909 which, more
than any other single factor, drew the line sharper between progressives

°The statement was made in a speech delivered in Winona,
Minnesota, the text of which is quoted by Herbert S. Duffy in his biography, Wm. Howard Taft (New York? Mint on Balch and Co., 1930),
pp. 239-40. Duffy adds that while Taft's choice of words (. . . best
o . . ever . . .) was "perhaps unfortunate," he was accurate in his
statement, since the Payne-Aldrich Bill was the best Republican tariff
bill to that date, in spite of its unpopularity in progressive quarters.
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and reactionaries and defined the progressive movement for the
country."^
A second source of bitterness in the party was the opening of
public lands to private concerns. Lands which Roosevelt had withdrawn
were released by Taft's Secretary of the Interior, Richard Ballinger.
Gifford Pinchot, Roosevelt's conservation head and now Chief Forester,
led an attack on Ballinger in which the latter was accused of acting
without regard for the public's interest. Pinchot was subsequently
fired for insubordination.

In the squabble which followed, a Congress-

ional Committee found Ballinger innocent of any wrongdoing and dismissed
Plnchot's charges. Nevertheless, there were many who questioned Taft's
judgment in firing Pinchot, and the series of accusations and counteraccusations had served to further arouse public and progressive sentiment.
As indicated, there was by this time an important element in the
party opposed to the policies of Taft and the Old Guard.

The issues are

set forth by DeWitt;
The fight was against the control of the government by special
interests. . . . The contest took the form primarily of a struggle
against corporations. This struggle had several phases: first,
and most Important, was the attempt to find some adequate means of
controlling and regulating corporate activities; second, and almost
as important, was the resistance to the efforts by corporations to
exploit the natural resources of the nation in their own behalf;
and, finally, came the revolt against the impudent, open revision
of the tariff in 1909 in the interest of trusts and monopolies.^
In March of 1910, the Republican Insurgents, having discovered
that they could outvote the standpat faction in the House by joining with

Benjamin P. DeWitt, The Progressive Movement (New Yorks
Macmillan Co., 1915), p. 69.
5

Ibid., p. 46.

The

progressive Democrats, revolted against the dictatorial Speaker Joseph
G. Cannon and took from him much of his power. By mid-1910 the
Republican Party had split wide open. The stage was set for the return
of Roosevelt.

In June he returned, already informed somewhat as to the

condition of things. Almost Immediately he set out to change them. He
began speaking out against the "perversion" of his program and proclaimed
that the government should Increase its powers in order to effect the
needed social and political reforms.
Early in 1911 the National Progressive Republican League was
formed "to promote popular government and progressive legislation,"
Senator LaFollette was its most likely candidate for the Republican nomination for President.

It was assumed that Roosevelt, who had assured

the nation that he would not seek a third term, would not be available;
but the ex-President had changed his mind.

Incensed by what he considered

to be Taft's many failings, and seemingly convinced that only he could
do the job right, Roosevelt returned to the political arena. He informed
the country in February of 1912 that he was indeed in the race and began
entering presidential primaries. Pushing the unwilling LaFollette to
one side, he assumed leadership of the Progressive wing and dug in.
Espousing a comprehensive progressive program, he vehemently attacked
Taft as a reactionary and a tool of the interests. His popularity grew
and he won most of the presidential primaries he entered. Taft was
reluctant to engage in the kind of campaigning his opponent was doing,
but as the pressure mounted and the charges shifted from the issues to
him personally, he began to fight back with equally angry attacks
against Roosevelt and the Progressives, whom he accused of being
dangerously radical.
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When the delegates met in convention in June, it was almost "no
contest." The Taft forces were in complete control of the proceedings,
and nearly every contested delegate was decided in his favor. Balked at
every turn, the Roosevelt supporters cried "fraud" and stormed from the
convention.

The Taft-men went on to approve a platform calling for

little in the way of reform.
Roosevelt and the Progressives met in convention in August, and
Roosevelt was duly nominated for President, with the Progressive Governor
of California, Hiram Johnson, getting the call for Vice-President. After
some behind-the-scenes debating, the party formed its platform.

It

called for most of the traditional progressive reforms and added others.
These reforms included nation-wide preferential primaries for presidential
candidates; direct election of United States senators; initiative, referendum, and recall; an easier method of amending the Constitution; social
and industrial Justice, i.e., legislation to prevent "industrial
accidents, occupational diseases, overwork, involuntary unemployment,
and other injurious effects incident to modern industry"; prohibition of
child-labor; minimum wage laws; the eight-hour day; "the establishment
of a strong federal administrative commission of high standing, which
shall maintain permanent active supervision over industrial corporations
engaged in interstate commerce"; tariff revision downward; conservation;
equal suffrage; the courts; and taxes. "Never before had an Important
political party taken up in its platform so many vital issues in such a
definite way."6

Roosevelt continued his advocacy of a federal government

strong enough to carry out these proposals.

Ibid., p. 85.
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Within the Democratic Party, progressivism had also been an
issue for some years.

In 1896 William Jennings Brvan ran on a Democratic

platform which, borrowing heavily from the Populists, opposed the trusts
and the high tariff and favored legislation more advantageous to the working classes. The year 1900 saw these Issues take a back seat to "imperialism" versus "prosperity." Roosevelt was progressive enough as President
to keep reform from being a Democratic tool in 1904 and 1908. It was not
until the Republicans under Taft had acquired the reputation of being
anti-reform that the Democrats were able to make appreciable headway under
that banner.
By 1909-1910 the progressive Democrats in Congress were joining
the insurgent Republicans to thwart the conservatives of both parties.
Indicative of the progressive trend, the 1910 election gave the Democrats
a majority in the House. Several states were in the hands of progressive
Democratic administrations. One of the most able governors of this group
was Woodrow Wilson, of New Jersey. He had been elected on a progressive
platform by the state machine which expected to be able to control him
from behind the scenes. To the chagrin of the "bosses," Wilson actively
carried out his promises and in the process wrested state control from
the machine.
He then drove through the legislature a sheaf of forward-looking
measures—reforms that were tailored to make reactionary New
Jersey one of the more liberal states. Filled with righteous
indignation, Wilson was at his best. He revealed irresistible
reforming zeal, burning eloquence, superb powers of leadership,
and a refreshing habit of appealing over the heads of the scheming
bosses to the sovereign people.?

7

Bailey, o£. cit., p. 581.
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With this background, Wilson was a logical candidate for the
presidential nomination. He carried with him to the convention at
Baltimore considerable support. His chief competitor was Champ Clark,
Speaker of the House

and a man of "only moderately progressive tenden-

cies." While Clark led in the early balloting, he couldn't muster the
necessary votes and the nomination went to Wilson. The party matched
its progressive candidate with a progressive platform.

It called for a

downward revision of the tariff and further stated;
We favor the vigorous enforcement of the criminal as well as
civil law against trust and trust officials and demand the enactment of such additional legislation as may be necessary to make it
impossible for a private monopoly to exist in the United States
. . . . Believing that the most efficient results under our system
of government are to be attained by the full exercise by the states
of their reserved sovereign powers, we denounce as usurpation the
efforts of our opponents to deprive the states of any of the rights
reserved to them, and to enlarge and magnify by indirection the
powers of the federal government. . . .
As indicated in the fore-going, all three parties professed to
be progressive. The difference lay in the degree to which they favored
it. Previous events had pushed to the fore the key issues of trusts
and tariff. While the Republicans called for a "stricter regulation of
trusts" and for a milder protective tariff, the Democrats demanded an
almost complete abolition of trusts and a tariff for revenue only and not
for protection. They both favored conservation, banking and currency
reform, and a corrupt-practices act. Wilson and Roosevelt differed
chiefly on their approach to the trust problem. Roosevelt felt that
trusts were not bad as long as they were subject to Federal control;
he seemed to be personally less anxious to abolish the tariff than
8
Deseret News, June 26, 1912.
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Wilson, although his party favored a sharp revision downward.
The campaign was often heated, and not only the candidates and
their backers, but also the press resorted to violent attacks. The outcome was foreseen as November approached, and it was no surprise when
Wilson won. He captured 435 electoral votes, compared to 88 for
Roosevelt and 8 for Taft. The popular vote gave Wilson 6,293,454;
Roosevelt 4,119,538; and Taft 3,484,980.

That this was more a victory

for progressivism than for the Democrats was evident. Roosevelt and
Taft garnered more than a million votes more than Wilson; but the two
progressives, Roosevelt and Wilson, received almost three times the
vote of the more conservative Taft.

CHAPTER II
UTAH POLITICS TO 1912
It is now necessary to examine briefly the course followed by
Utah politics up to 1912. The Mormons in Utah had no strong preference
for one national party over the other before 1872, even though they did
vote almost as a unit in state elections. As increasing bitterness
developed toward the Republican office holders in Washington and the
Territory, however, they became predominantly Democrats, During the
1870's and 1880's, the national Republicans passed progressively more
onerous legislation, culminating in the Edmunds and Edmunds-Tucker acts,
which deprived the Mormon Church of much of its property and took the
vote away from men living in polygamy.

Although the Church fought back

vigorously, it was finally forced to concede defeat.

In 1890 President

Wilford Woodruff issued his Manifesto, which officially rejected polygamy as a practice of the Church. Since polygamy had been the chief
obstacle to statehood, the way was then open for Utah to obtain that longsought-after status, which it did in 1896.
The territorial parties of that early period were the Mormon
People's Party and the anti-Mormon Liberal Party. The Liberals tended
to correspond to the national Republicans; and although they were unable
to win public office for more than fifteen years, they nevertheless
caused the Mormon leaders great concern.
The bitterness engendered by the oppressive Republican and the
vituperative Liberal forces was slow to die out, but important changes
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were taking place in both official and unofficial Mormon thinking by
the late 1880's. As early as 1888, Reed Smoot and other young Mormons
formed a Utah County Republican organization for "discussion and
advocacy of Republican principles." Another, largely non-Mormon, group
was formed in Ogden about the same time. When the relatively calm
Cleveland administration was replaced by Republicans in 1889, Church
leaders tried to forestall further contrary legislation and appointment
of hostile officers in the Territory by appealing to important Republicans in California. President Woodruff, George Q. Cannon, and H. B.
Clawson met in San Francisco in April, 1889, with Senator Leland Stanford
and other members of the railroad group which controlled California
politics.

The Californians urged abandonment of polygamy and agreed to

write to President Harrison, asking that he not make appointments until
he could learn more of the Utah situation.

Nothing of value came from

this meeting, and the new appointees were less friendly than those they
replaced.

It was later charged by Utah Democrats that

George Q. Cannon . . . had agreed to make every effort to transfer
the Mormon vote in Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, and other western states
to the Republican Party in exchange for assurance by the Republican
leaders that Republican support of anti-Mormon legislation and
Republican opposition to statehood would be withdrawn.2
There is no known record to support the claim.

•^B. H. Roberts, A Comprehensive History of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, Century One (Salt Lake City: Deseret News
Press, 1930), VI, 286.
2
Keith Wahlquist, "Reed Smoot," 1940 , p. 606. This manuscript
is a detailed account, not only of Smoot, but of the Mormons from the
earliest times to the death of Smoot. The writer, a Mormon and prominent
educator in Weber County, Utah, died suddenly In 1941, at which time
arrangements for the publication of the manuscript were dropped. The
manuscript is in the possession of his wife, who is now living in Ogden,
Utah.
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By 1890, the Liberal Party had won control of the Salt Lake City
and Ogden City governments. This was partly because polygamists among
the Mormons had been disfranchised by the Edmunds Act. A more sweeping
proposal, the Cullom-Struble Bill, introduced in Congress in 1890,
threatened to take the vote away from all Mormons. Seeing disaster in
the passage of the bill, the Church leaders were driven to further
action. Representatives were sent to Washington to try to defeat or
at least postpone the bill.
delay was granted.

The representatives were successful and a

Democrats again claimed that a promise to make Utah

Republican had been the price for non-enactment of the bill.^
It was also believed that a promise had been made in Washington
to "do something about polygamy,"4 and if so, that promise was kept.
In the face of insurmountable opposition to the Church because of
polygamy. President Woodruff in September of 1890 regretfully "advised"
the Church to abandc^ the practice. Thb Manifesto was read in Conference
in October and accepted by the Church,
The decision was not immediately believed by many non-Mormons,
and there were further setbacks for the Church.

Nevertheless, the

Church leaders had chosen their course and would not turn back. That
a new attitude toward the Republicans was blossoming soon became evident.
May 20, 1891, a Republican meeting was held in Salt Lake which adopted
resolutions calling for a political division in the Territory along

3
Roberts, o£, cit., p. 309,
Wahlquist, o£„ cit., p. 616,
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national party lines-5

On May 25, the Central Republican Club of Utah
c

was organized. Many important Mormons took active part in the movement.
The People's Party central committee decided on Way 29 to dissolve their
n

party to permit a realignment along national lines.

The Liberal Party,

however, refused to dissolve, and also opposed statehood. They feared
that as a state, Utah would easily come under Church control and nullify
their own gains. At a meeting on May 29, a Liberal speaker stated:
Now you young men of Utah who have worked with the People's
Party heretofore, we don't want you, that Is we don't want you in
the front ranks; if you join us you must remain in the rear and
work that way; but don't come to the front and ask to join in the
honor with us, because you are not entitled to it.8
This refusal of the Liberals to disband may well have been
responsible for the ease with which control of the Republican Party in
Utah passed into Mormon hands.
Not only for political reasons, but also for economic improvement
was the Church leaning toward Republicanism.

Arrington speaks of the

period immediately following the Manifesto as one of "accommodation" on
the part of the Church, and indicates that there was no pi actleal
alternative. He states:
The confiscation of more than a million dollars' worth of Church
property, . , . the effect of this confiscation and the depression
of the 1890's in creating a two-million-dollar Church debt; the end
of the frontier, the deteriorating man-land ratio, and the necessity
of providing economic opportunities for its growing membership; the
relative growth, in numbers and power, of Gentiles in the Mormon
commonwealth—all of these factors compelled Church leaders to
^Roberts, 0£. cit., p. 298.
6

Ibid.
7
Deseret News, June 6, 1891.
8

Ibid., May 30, 1891.
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re-examine the policies and position of the Church.
fl
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After the Manifesto Church leaders, for the first time in the
Church's history, solicited the aid of outside capital in developing
western industry. For the first time, the controlling Interest in
important Church-sponsored enterprises was sold to eastern investors.
For the first time. Church officials began to think of national
economic policy in terms agreeable to the conservative wing of the
Republican party. Absentee, individualistic, non-sectarian capitalism thus enveloped the Mormon economy at the turn of the century,
seemingly with the encouragement and assistance of general authorities
of the Church.9
By the 1890's both wool and sugar were becoming important crops
in Utah, and prominent people in the Church leadership were concerned
personally with this development.

It was not surprising that they should

turn to politics and to that party which traditionally favored business.
The McKinley tariff of 1890, which provided a bounty of 2 cents per
pound on domestic sugar, helped make Republicanism appealing—not only
to refinery owners, but to beet-growing farmers, as well. The Republican
approach to the tariff question, vital to both sugar and wool interests,
also won support for the party.

Thus, when the People's Party disbanded,

those of its members with investments in these burgeoning businesses
tended to become Republicans, However, the majority of Mormons, still
resentful of Republican-appointed Territorial officers, went into the
Democratic Party.
At the dissolution of the People's Party, the Liberals claimed
that the Church was trying to get a majority in both national parties.
9
^Leonard J. Arrington, "Trends in Mormon Economic Policy," a
paper presented at a symposium on Mormon Culture held by the Utah Academy
of Sciences, Arts, and Letters at Utah State University, November 14, 1952,
p. 4. This view is supported by Frank H. Jonas and Garth N. Jones in
their "Utah Presidential Elections," Utah Historical Quarterly, XXIV
(October, 1955), 291-92.
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Wahlquist states that it was known that in some parts of the Territory
leading Church men had been encouraged to become Republicans when their
own preference would have been to become Democrats. •*•" In answer to
protests within and without the Church, the Church's attitude toward
politics was summarized in June of 1891 in what is known as the "Times
Interview," A digest follows:
1. The Church will not assert any right to control the political
action of its members. As officers of the Church, they disclaim
any such right.
2. There will be no reason for the members of the Church to
come together and vote solidly if political conditions in Utah are
similar to those which prevail elsewhere.
3. However much appearances may have indicated that the Mormon
people have favored a union of Church and state (reference is made
to conditions that existed in earlier days in Utah), there is no
real disposition to unite Church and state; in fact, there should
be a separation between the two.
4. It is the wish of the Mormon people to unite with the great
national parties and conduct politics in Utah as they are conducted
in all other states; there is no reason why the members of the
Church should not act freely with the national parties at all times.
5. It is conceded that there is nothing to be gained for the
Church by securing for it political control in Utah with or without
statehood; the members and leaders of the Church desire to place
it in a position in the community like that occupied by other
churches; the only protection the Mormon Church desires is that
which it would obtain under general laws which secure the rights of
all denominations. It would be unwise for the Mormon people to
endeavor to receive any advantages not shared in by all other
religious people. All that is asked for the Church is that it
shall have equal rights before the law.H
In one form or another this disclaimer was repeated many times
in the years that followed, as in election after election the charge of
Church interference was raised by Democrats and non-Mormons. How much
*°Wahlquist, op_, cit., p. 629, Roberts states that Church
officials were afraid of a Mormon-Democrat non-Mormon-Republican split
in Utah and by 1894 were urging "those with no strong convictions
either way to be slow in choosing a party," o£. cit., p. 321.
11

Salt Lake Times, June 23, 1891,
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validity there was in the claims is difficult to ascertain. As shown
above, the Church leaders themselves generally favored the Republicans,
but to what extent they urged their convictions on the lay members has
not been wholly determined. However, the consensus seems to be that
Church leaders were largely instrumental in bringing about a realignment of voters, at first gradual, then sudden, which saw a large
Democratic margin in 1896 dissolve into a small Republican margin in
1900 (a position maintained through 1912).

Jonas and Jones state:

The main body of LDS Church membership and the majority of its
leaders had been Democratic before 1890. Gradually through the
influence and activity of several strong leaders. Reed Smoot,
George Q. Cannon, Lorenzo Snow, Joseph F. Smith, Francis M. Lyman,
John Henry Smith, among others, it became Republican,*2
Merrill states that from his evidence, the switch from Bryan in
1900 was attributable to the "dominant church." He adds:
It was a commonplace among politicians and editors that the
Republican National Committee . . . had made a deal with its
president Lorenzo Snow. The quid pro quo of the deal was never
specified nor the charges corroborated by sufficient evidence,
but they were repeated in all parts of the country and generally
believed in Utah. . . . The disappearance of Bryan's majority,
a shift of 53,000 votes, was incontrovertible evidence of Mormon
Church political control, in the opinion of the critics.*3
It should be emphasized, in connection with the foregoing, that
Mormons were never without a choice, since those men who might most have
wanted them to become Republicans, publicly and repeatedly assured them
12
Jonas and Jones, o£. cit., p. 291.
13
Milton R. Merrill, "Reed Smoot, Apostle in Politics,"
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Department of History, Columbis University,
1950, pp. 218-19.
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of their complete right to vote however they saw fit. President
Woodruff reiterated in 1892:
If we have any desire in this matter, it is that the people of
this Territory shall study well the principles of both the great
national parties, and then choose which they will join, freely,
voluntarily, and honestly, from personal conviction, and then stand
by it in all honor and sincerity. 4
The same sentiment was still being expressed in 1912.
Indicative of the sentiment in the Territory just after the
Manifesto were the results of the 1891 and 1892 elections. The Democrats
won the first with 51 per cent*5 0 f the votes; and the second, with
44 per cent. An indication of what was to come, however, can be seen in
those and other figures. The Liberals dropped from 26 per cent in 1891
to 20 per cent in 1892; and the Democrats lost 7 per cent, while the
Republicans rose 23 per cent to win 36 per cent of the total. The year
1893 saw the two major parties almost tied for legislative seats, but
the Liberals were beaten so badly that they formally dissolved the party
in December of that year.
Not only had Mormon-non-Mormon differences begun to lessen, as
suggested by the poor showing of the Liberals, but national feeling
toward the Mormons had begun to improve. In October, 1893, the property
of the Church was returned to it, and in December the Enabling Act passed
the House.

It passed the Senate, with the help of California Republicans,

in July, 1894, and was signed by President Cleveland on July 16.

l4

Deseret News, March 25, 1892.

*5Since the total vote varied so much from election to election,
it will be easier to follow the relative strength of the parties by showing each party total as a percentage of the election total.
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In keeping with the trend, both economic and political, toward
Republicanism, that party won its first Territorial victory in 1894,
gaining 52 per cent of the votes to 48 per cent for the Democrats and
electing a delegate to the National Congress and a majority of the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention.
A great deal of interest centered around the election of 1895,
which was to choose officers for the new state to be proclaimed the
following January. The Republicans, hoping to retain their lead, nominated Heber M. Wells for Governor and non-Mormon C. E. Allen for Congressman. The Democrats, thinking to pick up any wavering Mormon votes,
named John T. Caine for Governor and Brigham H. Roberts, of the First
Council of Seventy, for Congressman, and proposed to name as senators,
if they won. Apostle Moses Thatcher and ex-delegate Joseph W. Rawlings.
At this juncture, the question of "permission" was introduced
into the campaign, resulting in acrimony both within and against the
Church. Scarcely a month after the nominations. President Joseph F.
Smith, in a priesthood meeting, commented that, by agreement, men holding important positions in the Church should have permission from the
First Presidency before engaging in political office-seeking. Neither
Roberts nor Thatcher had done so. The Democrats immediately protested
the ruling, while the joyful Republicans reported that the Church wanted
the two men defeated.

President Woodruff's attempt to calm things by

explaining the permission rule had little effect, although he again disavowed any desire to dictate how the Church should vote.

16
Roberts, op_. cit., p. 332.
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The Republicans won again, but with another small margin. Wells
drew 39.8 per cent of the vote to 35.5 per cent for Caine, and a strong
Populist vote (23.6 per cent) was probably the deciding factor.
The year 1895 temporarily reversed the trend toward Republicanism and gave the Democrats a resounding victory. The primary issue for
the West was silver, and it was believed that Bryan's enthusiasm for that
metal would carry many western states, Utah included. The Republicans
in the state were divided on the silver question. Party leaders seemed
content to accept a national platform plank unfriendly to silver, after
the delegates from Utah and other Western states had walked out of the
national convention in protest.

In November, Bryan polled 87.7 per cent

of the votes to only 17.2 per cent for McKinley. Democrat William H.
King was elected representative to Congress with 53 per cent of the votes
to 37 per cent for his opponent; and most of the Democratic ticket for
the Legislature was successful,

(There were nearly 7,500 fewer votes

cast for Representative than for President.)
The campaigning had been carried out in a continuing atmosphere
of il|: will, since the permission rule controversy had not yet been
fully lesolved.

A "Political Rule of the Church," stating that Churfh

officers should seek official permission before accepting any position
that would take them away from their Church duties for any prolonged
17
time, was presented to the Church in conference and accepted.
After
much persuasion, Brigham H. Roberts had agreed to the rule; but Moses
Thatcher continued to refuse to submit to it.
17
Deseret Evening News, April 6, 1896

It was expected that
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the Democrat-controlled Legislature would name him as senator, at least
partly to embarrass the Church.

An attempt was made, but he lost by a

small margin. He subsequently made his peace with the Church, and the
matter of permission did not come up again.
The Democratic momentum gained in 1896 carried over to 1898,
although somewhat diminished, as B. H. Roberts was elected as Representative to Congress with 54 per cent of the vote to 46 per cent for the
Republican candidate. The Legislature remained Democratic,
Then two things happened which dimmed Democratic hopes for a
victory in 1900. First, the Legislature was unable to agree on a choice
for senator, even after 150 ballots, so none was named in 1899. Second,
because he had been a polygamist, the national House of Representatives
refused to permit Roberts to take his seat in Congress, and he had to be
replaced in a special election.

In addition, the fact that President

McKinley had appointed polygamlsts to postmasterships and other offices
18
strengthened the Republicans among the former polygamists. *
The Republicans hoped that with the return of dissatisfied "silverites" to the party, they would be victorious in the fall of 1900. Planning
a vigorous campaign, they approved the Gold Standard and a protective
tariff and talked of prosperity and good times under Republican rule.
The Democrats campaigned chiefly on a platform of bi-metalism, while condemning the Church-Republican leaders as being in collaboration with the
money interests of the East. The Republicans elected their ticket by
small majorities, picking up where they had stopped in 1895. The
18
Roberts, o£, cit., p. 371.
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governorship was won 51.2 per cent to 47.8 per cent for the Democrats;
and McKinley polled 50.7 per cent to 48.1 per cent for Bryan. The
Republican-dominated Legislature elected Thomas Kearns, a Catholic, as
senator for the remaining four years of a six-year term.
As the 1902 election approached. Reed Smoot announced his
intention to run for senator. A prominent businessman, he was widely
known in rural areas as a result of his wool-buying trips while head of
the Provo Woolen Mills-

At the same time, his interest in mining,

manufacturing, and business had earned him recognition and acceptance by
influential urban groups. Mormon and non-Mormon alike. Nevertheless,
there was opposition to his candidacy from several sources. First,
there were party members who objected to his sudden rise to such an
important position. Although he had been one of the very early Republicans in Utah, this was his first attempt to hold public office. His
critics felt he should work his way up, as others had had to do. Second,
there were Mormon and non-Mormon party members who felt that his closeness to the Church disqualified him for high level politics. Just two
years earlier he had been elevated to the Quorum of Twelve Apostles,
the second highest calling in the Church; and it was believed that
allegiance to either job would force Smoot to compromise the other.
Also, it was reported that President Roosevelt had serious reservations
about his running for this reason,19 although after his election Smoot
was given almost unqualified support by the President.

It was charged

19
Wahlquist, ojo. cit., p. 715. Merrill makes the same assertion.
op. cit., p. 104.
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then, and on many subsequent occasions by Democrats and disgruntled
Republicans in and out of the Church, that Smoot would get or was getting
strong support from the Church to the disadvantage of all others. Smoot
2D
denied that such was the case.

In spite of these objections, Smoot

began to work diligently for the election of men who would, in turn,
support him.

Democratic arguments that a Church official should not

seek high office were not enough to win, as the Republicans elected
the representative to Congress with 51 per cent of the vote to 45 per
cent for the Democrat. They also had a mjaority in the Legislature,
which named Smoot to the Senate in January of 1903.
No sooner had Smoot's election been announced, than efforts were
made, beginning in Utah and spreading through the nation, to keep him
from taking his seat. The charges were numerous—including that he was
a polygamist, that as an Apostle he could not take the oath of a senator,
and that the Church was violating its promises of conformity to law by
letting its leaders enter politics. Months of investigation and debate
by the Senate—over a period of more than four years' time, which
inquired into Smoot's private and public life and the practices of the
Church—followed before he was allowed to take his place February 20,
1907.
To the men whom he had supported and who had supported him in
1902, Smoot added others and effectively organized them, strengthening
his own position within the party until by 1904 he was its most
20The evidence shows that he did indeed receive considerable
support and encouragement from President Joseph F. Smith and Others
during his political career, at least through 1912. For a discussion
in detail, see Merrill, og, cit., p. 145.
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powerful member. Even Senator Kearns, who was running for re-election
and who had previously led the party, was unable to regain control.
Smoot was able to keep his organization together and to virtually control
politics in the state until 1914. During that year, weaknesses which
Smoot had been able to overcome in 1912 caused the breakup of his
"machine," although he, personally, was successful for many more years.
If Roosevelt had been willing to support Smoot, Smoot was no
less willing to support the President. Roosevelt was already very
popular in Utah, partly because of his attitude toward Smoot; and in
1904, Smoot spared no effort to further the Roosevelt cause in the
state.
As his friends rose in the party organization, Smoot's enemies
in and out of the party became increasingly bitter. Senator Kearns,
who had bought the Salt Lake Tribune in 1901, and Frank J. Cannon—
one-time Republican and friend of the Church; but then a Democrat,
caustic critic of the Church, and managing editor of the Tribune—began
attacking Smoot and the Church in the columns of that paper. On
September 7, 1904, these men and other non-Mormons formed the American
Party, whose stated purpose was to defeat Smoot and embarrass the
Church. After a campaign marked by recrimination, the Republicans
again won. Roosevelt defeated Parker with a 61.4 per cent to 32.8 per
cent majority; and the Republican candidate for Governor received 50
per cent of the vote to 37 per cent for the Democratic candidate and
8 per cent for the American candidate. The Legislature, in the hands
of Smoot Republicans, passed over Kearns and elected George Sutherland
as senator.
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Although never successful in state elections, the American Party,
campaigning hard, was able to elect the mayor and a majority of the city
council of Salt Lake City in 1905 and to continue that municipal control
until 1911. This was done in spite of Smoot's efforts and was a continuing source of embarrassment and irritation for him.
All three parties named candidates for representative to Congress
in 1906. The Republicans—campaigning on the records of Roosevelt,
Smoot, Sutherland, and Joseph Howell (who was seeking re-election)—won
easily, as Howell received 47 per cent of the vote to 32 per cent for
the Democrat and 14 per cent for the Americanite.

(The American Party

vote was nearly double the previous vote and was as high as the party
ever reached.)
William Howard Taft had been chosen by Roosevelt to be his
successor and, as such, he was popular in Utah from the start as the
21
1908 campaigning began.
His opponent was William Jennings Bryan,
destined to lose for the third time. Three state tickets were named
for the offices of Governor and Congressman. The Republicans retained
their strong grip on the state, giving Taft a margin of 56.2 per cent
of the vote to Bryan's 39.1 per cent. William Spry, Smoot's candidate
for Governor, gathered 47 per cent to 39 per cent for the Democratic
candidate and 10 per cent for the American candidate. Joseph Howell
was elected Congressman by similar margins.
The following January, the Republican-controlled Legislature
elected Smoot to a second term as Senator, During Taft's administration.

21

Ibid., p. 148.
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Smoot began to emerge as a power in national polities. From their
first meeting, he and Taft were on a very friendly basis.2*

i n the

Senate he was early named to the important Finance Committee. Voting
consistently with the conservatives, he was recognized by them as a
dependable, hard-working, and skillful addition to their ranks. He
was particularly energetic in his support of the high protective
tariff.

The mining, sugar, and wool interests in the state approved

of his voting record.
The 1910 contest for Congressman again showed the Republican
strength in Utah, as Joseph Howell won a fourth term with more votes
than his two opponents combined. He received 49 per cent to 32 per
cent for the Democratic candidate and 14 per cent for the American
candidate.

In Salt Lake County, the Republicans broke the American

Party hold on municipal offices with a plurality of from 2,600 to 3,200
votes over the Americanites. The Democrats showed a poor third.

Summary
This necessarily brief sketch has outlined the course of
political history in Utah through 1910. An analysis of the foregoing
establishes several facts:
1. Prior to 1890, the Mormon People's Party was able to elect
city governments in all but the non-Mormon mining towns, and such
territorial offices as were subject to election.

22

Ibid., p. 149.
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2. When the People's Party was dissolved in 1891, most of its
members switched their allegiance to the Democrats in protest to the
way the national Republicans had treated the Church.
3. Church leaders, realizing the need for economic development
in the state, turned to Republican financiers outside of Utah for help.
Also, hoping to avoid damaging legislation and in their increasing role
as businessmen, hoping to benefit from the conservative, protective
policies of the Republican Party—they swung their support to that party,
beginning in 1888 and 1889 and extending beyond 1912.
4. While maintaining vigorously and repeatedly that Church
members were free to vote as they chose. Church leaders did favor certain
candidates from time to time and gave them encouragement and support.
Knowledge of this practice undoubtedly affected some Mormon votes,
5.

During the period discussed, voting superiority passed from

the hands of the Democrats to those of the Republicans. The Democrats
carried the state in 1891 and 1892; lost out in 1894 and 1895; came on
strong for Bryan in 1896, when silver was the issue, and 1898; faded
narrowly in 1900; and had not regained state control by 1912,
6.

The non-Republicans in every election, to greater or lesser

degree, seized upon the "Church interference" theme as a campaign weapon,
repeating the charge of "deal" and bitterly criticizing any current
statement by the Church bearing on politics.
7. The Republicans under Smoot had an iron grip on state
politics from 1900 to 1910 and beyond, polling nearly 50 per cent of
the votes each election, in spite of a fairly strong anti-Mormon third
party.
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Tables 1 and 2 indicate the pattern of change in Utah voting
through 1910.

TABLE 1
TOTAL UTAH VOTE AND PER CENT THEREOF WON BY MAJOR PARTIES
IN STATE ELECTIONS FROM 1891-1910

Year

Office

T

<*al
Vote

Democrats

Republicans

Liberals

Am e f i c a n
Party

1891

Territorial Legislature

28,177

51%

23%

26%

1892

Delegate
to Cong.

34,577

44%

35%

20%

1894

Delegate
to Cong.

40,831

48%

52%

1895

Governor

50,985

36.5%

39.8%

1896

Representative

74,720

53%

37%

1898

Representative

57,756

54%

46%

1900

Governor

92,980

47.8%

51.2%

1902

Representative

84,842

45%

51%

1904

Governor

102,307

37%

50%

8%

1906

Representative

84,092

32%

47%

14%

1908

Governor

111,519

39%

47%

10%

1910

Representative

102,233

32%

49%

14%
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TABLE 2
TOTAL UTAH VOTE AND PER CENT THEREOF WON BY MAJOR PARTIES
IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS FROM 1896-1908

Year

Total Vote

Democrats

Republicans

1896

82,312

82.7%

17.2%

1900

92,145

48.1%

50.7%

1904

101,616

32.8%

61.4%

1908

108,656

39.1%

56.2%

CHAPTER III
THE UTAH ECONOMY
In this and the following chapters a study will be made of
conditions, events and people which may have had some bearing on the
outcome of the Utah voting in 1912.
Of general concern in an election year is the economic status
of the areas involved. Utah in 1912 was experiencing a time of statewide growth in which production records were being raised—not only in
agriculture, but also in industry.

The newspapers and periodicals of

that year manifested a feeling of confidence and satisfaction with the
present and of optimism for the future, beading figures in the state
were boasting of bumper crops and pointing happily at the recognition
which Utah was receiving from outside the state as a result of her
increasing importance in the family of states. The Salt Lake Tribune
of March 31 headlined a full page in large print as follows:
UTAH PRODUCTS ADD VASTLY TO STATE'S RICHES
RESIDENTS ENJOYING YEAR OF UNPRECEDENTED ACTIVITY IN INDUSTRIAL LINES AND PRODUCTION OF SOIL, MINES AND LIVESTOCK
RANGES
OUTLOOK NEVER BEFORE 30 PROMISING
HIGH PRICE FOR METAL GRATIFYING
COPPER, SILVER AND LEAD MARKETS GIVE ASSURANCE OF STABILITY
FRUITGROWERS LOOK FOR UNPARALLELED YIELD: WOOL PRODUCERS WELL
SATISFIED: SALT AND SUGAR OUTPUT GROWS.
If an occasional note of apprehension was sounded, it was out
of fear that the Government might do something to hurt the existing
prosperity. The chief cause for concern was the debate going on in

Congress about a broad tariff revision. The tariff question, which
will be discussed more fully in a later chapter, was of vital interest
to Utahns, most of whom preferred to leave duties unchanged. Their
uneasiness about it was evident all year long, but there was little
else to cause them economic worry.
Slightly more than half (52 per cent) of the state's people were
living on some 21,676 farms in 1912, and the farmers were having another
good year. More grain was grown in Utah that year than in any previous
year in the history of the state. An average of 29.2 bushels per acre
was raised, compared with a national average of 17.2 bushels per acre.
Total production of spring and winter wheat was fourth in the nation
in bushels per acre. Utah ranked first in bushels per acre of barley;
third in potatoes, fourth in oats, and fourth in tons per acre of hay.
The total produce in bushels per acre was second in the nation.

The

total value of the 1912 crop was officially reported as $25,281,822,2
about one-sixth of the total value of all the state's products.
Indicative perhaps of Utah's prestige as a farm state is the
following report from the Salt Lake Tribune of September 17:
Salt Lake is to be headquarters for eleven western and northwestern states in a big branch office to be established here by
the United States Department of Agriculture. . . . Business
connected with the bureau has increased so rapidly in these . . «
states that the Department of Agriculture has determined to
establish the branch office to more readily care for it at first
hand.

State of Utah, First Annual Report of the State Bureau of
Immigration, Labor, and Statistics, 1911-1912, pp. 69-70.""
2Ibid., p. 70,
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The work of the bureau is educational as well as supervisional
including instruction of farmers, stock raisers and dairymen in
the most advanced methods of pursuing their activities.
A follow-up editorial the next day praised the action.
One of the top cash crops year in and year out was sugar beets.
Utah was fourth in the nation in production of beets, although by 1912
her total was only a third that of the leading producer, Colorado.
Sugar production had been important in the state since about 1890—when
with the support and encouragement of the Mormon Church a factory was
built at Lehi and successfully operated.

By 1898, production had begun

in the Ogden area; and by 1912, there were six factories in active
operation in the state. The Ogden Standard stated that the industry
regularly employed 10,000 people, and 15,000 were employed during the
harvest. Ten to fifteen thousand families—or 50,000 to 75,000 people—
depended on it.
As early as August it was predicted that the beet crop would
probably exceed that of any other year.4

The 488,000 tons of beets

raised that year yielded 120,000,000 pounds of sugar.5

This production

was an increase over 1911 and justified the earlier confidence. The
only disturbing factor was the tariff uncertainty.
The raising of sheep was another important part of the Utah
scene.

Eighth in the nation in amount of wool produced, the 1912 clip

was estimated to have been sold for two million dollars. Mutton that

3

0?den Standard, April 17, 1912.

4

Salt Lake Tribune, August 15, 1912.

5
State of Utah, Immigration, Labor, and Statistics Report, p. 178.
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year brought $2,200,000. Nearly all of the more than four-milliondollar total was "spent within our state to the benefit of the citizens
therein."5

The wool was described as the best ever sheared in the state
n

and averaged 16 cents per pound to the growers.

This price was felt

by some to be 3 to 7 cents per pound below what otherwise might have
been expected, because of tariff agitation.

But such loss as there

might have been was at least partially offset by a 15 per cent reduction
in freight rates by the Interstate Commerce Commission in April, which,
it was estimated, would save the growers about $48,000 on a 15,000,000
pound clip.9

(The 1912 Utah clip was almost 19,000,000 pounds.) Again,

except for an uneasiness about the future of the tariff, the sheepmen
were satisfied.
Mining was attracting a lot of attention in the state in 1912.
Nearly all the newspapers carried extensive mining news; the larger
dailies devoted from a half to a full page to mining as a regular
feature. Readers were kept up to the minute about production, sales,
the stock exchange, new mines, and anything else pertaining to the
Industry—not only in Utah, but in the West in general. These reports
indicated that mining and mineral sales were in good shape, with prices
high and many new locations being Investigated.

During the entire year,

5

State of Utah, Annual Report of the State Board of Sheep
Commissioners, November 30, 1912, p. 12.
'State of Utah, Immigration, Labor, and Statistics Report,
p. 112.
o

°3tate of Utah, Sheep Commissioners' Report, p. 12.
9

0gden Standard, April 13, 1912.
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the newspapers were devoid of any important critcism of production,
prices, or sales. The tariff uncertainty and a Government regulation
received what criticism there was. A Federal Land Department ruling
that new mines could not be patented unless it could be proven that
they indeed held ore to be mined was viewed with alarm on the ground that
it would discourage new developments. This ruling was made in April,
and after a few days it dropped from the news and did not reappear; however, the tariff remained a topic of discussion the remainder of the
year.
Production of silver, copper, lead, and zinc was higher in 1912
than in the previous year, and only gold production fell off. The total
value of mineral production was $42,922,302 for the year. Coal production was valued at $5,219,322.

Oil fields had been found in the state,

and it was felt that a combination of science and capital could make
them yield a rich harvest, also.
Industry as a whole was hailed and put on display during what
the Salt Lake Tribune called the "biggest week in the history of Salt
Lake City,"11

The first week in October saw visitors and delegates from

many states and foreign countries in Salt Lake for the Irrigation
Congress, Electrical Parade, and State Fair. The Fair was called the
"best to date," and the other events received wide acclaim.
Earlier in the year, the Tribune stated that "conservative
estimates place products at an enormous total for this year" and added

10

State of Utah, Immigration, Labor, and Statistics Report,

p. 151.
Salt Lake Tribune, October 1, 1912.
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that the renown of the state was world wide. Manufactured goods alone
were placed at $75,000,000; and the total of all products, at
$186,000.000.12

Although exact figures were not found for 1912, the

following statistics give an indication of the growth that was then
taking place.
11,785 workers-

In 1909 there were 749 manufacturing places employing
They paid 18,399,634 in wages and produced goods

valued at $61,989,277.

By 1911 there were 781 manufacturing places

(half in Salt Lake City) employing 14,529 workers. Wages amounted to
$11,814,000, and good produced were valued at $66,432,000.l4 The
estimates named above suggest that this rate of growth was continuing,
or even accelerating, through 1912.
The 1912 report of the Bureau of Immigration, Labor, and
Statistics had this survey of labor conditions in the state:
Generally speaking, the labor situation in Utah is in first
class shape, and prospects for a continuance of this pleasing
condition are exceedingly bright. In Salt Lake City and Ogden
the skilled crafts are fairly well organized, as well as some
classes of common labor; outside of these cities, labor is
practically unorganized. Our scales of wages are quite high,
much above the average in the country as a whole. This seems
altogether necessary because in the principal cities of the State
the cost of living is fully equal to that in the largest cities of
the Union generally and greater than that in a great many cities
of equal size. The building trades are well employed. (Two
million dollar Capitol, $600,000 high school, $300,000 State
University building, one million dollar hotel.)
The mining industry, employing about 13,000 men, is in splendid
shape.15
12

Ibid., June 2, 1912.

13

Wain Sutton, (ed.), A Centennial History (New York: Lewis
Historical Publishing Co., 1949), I, 858.
14

Commercial Club Publicity Bureau, Salt Lake City and the State
of Utah (Salt Lake City: Sunset Magazine Homeseeker's Bureau of Information, 1911), p. 25.
xu

State of Utah, Immigration, Labor, and Statistics Report, p. 32.
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The high cost of living referred to here was mentioned editorially by the newspapers a time or two during the year, and was mentioned
briefly by the Progressive state platform,1**

but even so it did not

appear to generate much interest as a political or campaign issue.
The labor scene was marred by three major and several minor
strikes in 1911 and 1912. Several of these had as a primary goal the
winning of company recognition of a union, although others were solely
for wage increases. The railmen struck in October of 1911 for recognition of their union, but were unsuccessful. There was no violence.
The American Smelting and Refining Company at Murray was struck in May,
1912.

Six hundred men were out some six weeks, but were unsuccessful

in getting the pay raise they wanted. Strike-breakers were brought in
and two men were killed in the fighting which ensued. At the Utah
Copper Company mine at Bingham, more than four thousand men struck in
mid-September, 1912, demanding recognition of their union (the Western
Federation of Miners) and a 50 cents per day raise.17

Company officials

refused to recognize Federation spokesmen, and no progress was made.
When strike-breakers were brought in, the miners—many of them
foreigners—armed themselves and successfully kept the newcomers out.
Still refusing to talk to Federation leaders, the Company finally
agreed to the pay hike; and the miners, whose position was deteriorating rapidly, accepted. The strike died out in mid-October with no

Salt Lake Tribune, September 14, 1912.
17

State of Utah, Immigration. Labor, and Statiatics Report,
p. 31. The Report includes a rather general, but apparently inclusive
account of strikes in Utah during 1911 and 1912.
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serious casualties.1®
None of these strikes seems to have had any political significance, in spite of the bitterness of some of them. An occasional
editorial criticized the use of striking as a weapon,19 but for the
most part the quarrel was left to the antagonists and was reported as
straight news by the newspapers. There seemed to be no desire on the
part of the press to make a political issue of labor unrest.
From this review of the economic situation in the state, it is
evident that, on the whole, Utahns were satisfied with conditions as
they existed in 1912- They were optimistic about the future. To say
there were no problems and no discontent would be to mislead. However,
there was no economic problem or discontent great enough to cause any
sizable group to seek its solution by a change of government on either
a national or state level.

1R

Ibid. A full account of the strikes was also carried from day
to day in the major newspapers, beginning September 17 and continuing
through mid-October.
19

Deseret News, September 19, 1912.

CHAPTER IV

THE PRESS
The Deseret News was the first and oldest newspaper in the
state, having had its beginning in 1850. Owned by the Mormon Church
and serving an area at first overwhelmingly Mormon—the News naturally
bore the Church's mark.

As non-Mormons moved into the area, this pre-

occupation of the News with Church affairs prompted the formation of
opposition papers. During the 1870's and 1880's, when the Mormonnon-Mormon strife was so intense, conditions forced the News into an
especially close relationship with the Church. All Church news, as
well as some secular news, was printed therein; and, editorially, the
News defended the faith against all comers. Politically, during this
period, the News naturally championed the cause of the People's Party,
which represented the Mormons. With the dissoluton of this party and
the passing of Mormons into the Republican and Democratic parties, the
News assumed a non-partisan position in politics which was maintained
for several years.

The News continued to be the official organ of the

Mormon Church, however, and as the Church leaders began to give support
to the G.O.P, in the late 1890's and early 1900's, the paper also began
to change its position. By 1912, the paper was definitely, although not
rabidly. Republican in its views.
Wendell J. Ashton, Voice in the West (New York: Duel, Sloan
and Pearce, 1950), p. 207.
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As the official Church newspaper, the News undertook to answer
criticism toward the Church, When the American Party was organized in
1904, as a protest against Church "interference" in politics, a most
vitriolic editorial battle began between the News and the Salt Lake
Tribune, organ of the anti-Mormon opposition.

It continued without

abating until about 1910 when it began to subside, only to flare up
again with new vigor in 1912. This aspect of the campaign will be
treated in another chapter.
Since the Church and the Peseret News had accepted Republicanism by 1912, it was not surprising that they were both solidly behind
President William Howard Taft in the campaign of that year.
The Salt Lake Tribune got its start in 1870 as the Mormon
Tribune, the "Organ of the liberal cause in Utah." Edited by malcontents
in the Church, W. S. Godbe, E. L. T. Harrison, et al., it was from the
beginning critical of the Church.

After six months, the word "Mormon"

was dropped from its title, and the paper went on to become the chief
journalistic tormenter of the Church for more than sixty years. In
1883, C. C. Goodwin, a bitter opponent of the Church, became its editor.
He was succeeded by others as capable and bitter as he. For a while
in 1904, Frank J, Cannon, a prominent anti-Church Democrat, was the
editor.
In 1901, the Tribune was bought hy Thomas Kearns and David
Keith. Kearns had served as a Republican senator, but had had a falling
out with the state Republican leaders, many of whom were Mormons. A
Catholic himself, Keams was angry with the Church also for its refusal
to support his candidacy for a second term in 1904. For t h o s e and
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other reasons he joined with other non-Mormons to form the American
Party. Their aim was to discredit the Church and destroy Reed Smoot,
who had replaced him as the state Republican Party leader. The Tribune
appears to have been the chief weapon of the Americanites and later antiMormons, and its pages were filled daily with ridicule, sarcasm, and
insults,
Thomas Kearns was attracted to the Republican Party through
his interest in mining. He had worked himself up from mine hand to
chief figure in the Utah Mining Company and was vitally interested in
the protection offered by the G.O.P.; in 1912 he and the Tribune were
solidly behind William H. Taft.
The Herald-Republican, organized in 1909, was formed from two
other papers, the Daily Herald and the Intermountain Republican. The
Herald had been started in 1870 and, in its early days, had "sought
2
honestly and valiantly to be an independent paper,"

but even then it

was accused by anti-Mormon papers of being Church oriented.

In 1891

the Herald became the official organ of the Democratic Party, with
Democratic stalwart B. H, Roberts as editor. Roberts resigned in 1896
because of the stand the paper took on the "permission manifesto" of
the Church, which he was opposing at the time.

The paper continued

with Democratic leanings, however, until about 1898, from which time on
the Herald remained non-partisan.

In 1909 it was bought out by a

group of prominent Republicans—including Reed Smoot, D. G. Jackling,
2

J. Cecil Alter, Early Utah Journalism (Salt Lake City: Utah
State Historical Society, Stevens and Wallis, Inc., 1938), p. 310.
3

Supra, pp. 21-22.
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E. H. Callister, and others. Smoot already owned the Intermountain
Republican, which he had set up in 1906 in the belief that newspaper
support was essential to his political success.
Prominent in business and in the Mormon Church, Smoot associated
with men in and out of the Church whose interests were similar to his
own.

Not only for his own benefit, but for the benefit of his friends

and the Church as well, Smoot and the Herald-Republican were solidly
behind William H. Taft.
A fourth Salt Lake City paper was the Evening Telegram, owned
in 1912 by the Kearns-Keith Interests, and a companion to the Tribune.
Called an independent newspaper by its owners, it, too, was quite
solidly behind Taft. There were several other newspapers in Salt Lake
City, but as they were all weeklies, they did not have the importance
of the dailies—particulary the News, Tribune, and Herald-Republican.
From the foregoing, it will be seen that the Salt Lake papers
were in an interesting but awkward position in 1912—that of having to
agree while disagreeing.

The lengths to which they sometimes went

were ludicrous when viewed from the present, but they show how strong
the feeling was. Each supported Taft, but the Tribune fought the
Herald-Republican to get at Smoot and fought the News because of the
Church. The Herald-Republican fought back at the Tribune and occasionally took a swipe at the News when either opposed Smoot, The News
battled the Tribune on the Church issue and made an infrequent sally in
the direction of Smoot and the HeraId-Republican•

The effectiveness of

the part each paper played in the progress of the campaign is difficult
to evaluate, as one must depend almost entirely on the contents of the
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papers themselves, which, one suspects, may be misleading.

In a battle

for subscribers and prestige, irresponsible or exaggerated claims were
made, abusive language was employed editorially, and the relative
importance of the contenders was debated frequently.
The HeraId-Repub1ican is examined first in this study because
it is the only one for which exact circulation figures were found.
Presumably accurate, they provide a point of departure. A 1912 law
required that in April and October all newspapers make a sworn statement of their total circulation, beginning in 1913. The HeraldRepublican announced on October 3, 1912, its intention to publish
figures for the six months just ended and challenged the others to do
likewise.

It especially dared the Tribune to publish its figures, sug-

gesting in editorials over a week's time that it was afraid to do so.
Whatever the reason, no other Salt Lake paper responded, which may
suggest that their circulations were smaller than that of the HeraldRepublican. The latter boasted an average daily circulation from April
to the end of September of 18,924, and an average Sunday circulation of
30,518,

Editorially the paper claimed a larger daily and Sunday circu-

lation than any two papers in Utah. This was obviously not true, but no
refutation of the claim was found in other papers.

In 1910 the Tribune

had had an average daily circulation of 15,975 and a Sunday circulation
of 22,783.5 The News had had 8,295 daily and 10,897 semi-weekly, with
no Sunday edition.

These figures must have increased some by 1912.

4
Herald-Republican, Salt Lake City, Utah, October 3, 1912.
Alter, op_. cit., p. 360.
Ashton, op. cit., p. 399.
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By 1913 the Telegram could claim only 8,406 with no Sunday edition.
These figures may support the HeraId-Republ1can's claim to the highest
circulation; but, if so, the margin must have been very small except in
the case of the Telegram.
The Herald-Republican campaigned vigorously for both the national
and state Republican tickets, with much more concern over Roosevelt than
Wilson.

Its methods, in this writer's opinion, were often shoddy and

unethical, if not dishonest. The most thoroughly one-sided of all, it
slanted the news in numerous ways.

Everything which Taft did received

careful coverage. Lead articles nearly every day called attention to
his every speech and act, and editorials praised his strong points.
When Roosevelt entered the campaign, his speeches were often not even
printed. When they were, the editors tore them apart and ridiculed
them. When he was shot in October, an editorial emphasized that a
"lunatic" had done it and that the incident had nothing to do with the
campaign—the intimation being that Roosevelt had not caused that much
interest. Sympathy was extended to the "ex-president," but it was
cautioned that no one should let his sympathy lead him to vote for the
man.

It was added that Roosevelt himself would not want a lot made of

the affair.8
Never one to back down, the He raId-R epubli can reported even Taft
setbacks as victories. The Roosevelt win in Ohio was headed:

Estimate

7
Evening Telegram, Salt Lake City, Utah, October 4, 1913.
8

Herald-Republican, October 16, 1912.
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is Ten Ohio Taft Votes," and when Taft lost in Illinois, the article
was preceded by the official excuse of Taft's Illinois managerLocal opposition was bltingly dealt with. The report of the
Bull Moose Convention at Provo was preceded by a box containing the
following:
Two hundred persons who professed themselves eager to gratify
Colonel Theodore Roosevelt's wish to be president of the United
States, held a state convention of the "third party" in the Opera
House here today. Of the delegates in the delegation, two-thirds
were former members of the American Party and the remaining onethird was made up of former state and federal office holders and
has-been politicians.
To the casual observer at the convention, the bandana-bedecked
delegates suggested a South American army, nine-tenths generals
and one-tenth privates. The impression of the gathering today was
that it was nine-tenths office-seekers and one-tenth small bore
politicians. . .there were few former real Republicans in the
Convention.1^
Anyone who came out for Roosevelt was labeled insincere and an officeseeker.

Editorials reiterated the theme; and, by September, the paper

was referring to the "Bull Con Party"—not only in editorials, but
in lead articles on the front page.
During the national convention, news service articles were not
used by the Herald-Republican, although they were used by the other
papers.

Instead, Arthur J. Brown, the paper's correspondent in Chicago,

wired back heavily-loaded stories. His lead article of June 23 began
as follows:
Grimly determined to stem once and for all the tide of demogogueism that threatened from day to day to roll over the Republican
national convention and to tear it loose from its moorings, setting
9

Ibid., May 23, 1912.

10

Ibid., July 28, 1912.
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the Grand Old Party adrift upon a sea of doubt and uncertainty
with no more appeal to the voters of the United States than can be
presented by the Democracy, the delegates of the fifteenth
quadrennial gathering renominated William Howard Taft of Ohio for
president of the United States. . . - 1 1
Until the Democratic convention, very little was said about
Wilson; but, once nominated, he began to receive the unkind attention
of the editors.12 He was pictured as a dishonest scoundrel who had
changed his opinions to win votes, and who could not be trusted. When
he had won, the Herald-Republican editorial comment was to the effect
that "we hope he will do a good job but we doubt it."
During the entire campaign. Reed Smoot's name appeared with
gieat frequency in the pages of his paper. He was given credit for
numerous bflls with which he had been associated, and reference was
made to his standing with the Republican hierarchy. His views, along
with those of other leading Republicans in the state, were quoted in
lead articles and discussed editorially, and his state candidates were
regularly in the public eye. Without a doubt, the Herald-Republican was
used to the utmost to secure the votes of Utahns first for Taft, and
second for the state ticket.
As stated earlier, the Salt Lake Tribune also favored Taft,
and for reasons similar to those of the Herald-Republican. Only
slightly, if any, less extreme than its competitor, the Tribune also
praised Taft and pilloried Roosevelt. Taft was described as a friend
of Utah, and speeches by him and his supporters were headlined on the

U

Ibid.. July 23, 1912.

12

The editors of the Herald-Republican were not named in the
paper, and this writer was not able to ascertain who they were.
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front page and enthusiastically reviewed editorially.

On the other

hand, Roosevelt was reviled as being dishonest, a liar, as deliberately
misleading the country, as being self-centered, and as wanting to win
only for personal power and gain; in short, he was accused of almost
every moral and ethical crime known to politics.
However, when it came to state politics, the Tribune was hopeful
of a great future for the third party.

The Tribune was dead set against

Smoot and what it repeatedly called "the federal bunch."

It berated

almost daily "machine control" of the state; and its editorials were
equally, if not more, vitriolic toward Smoot on the state level than
toward Roosevelt on the national. An editorial on July 29 stated that
"the Progressive Republicans in this state have a grievance right here
at home that far outweighs any interest which they might feel in the
13
personal fortunes of Colonel Roosevelt,"
In an attempt to discredit Smoot, the Tribune questioned his
motives from time to time. After relating how Roosevelt had helped
Smoot when his Senate seat was in question, the editors say, "It
would therefor be almost unpardonable for Smoot to be really opposed
to Roosevelt. We cannot believe that he is. There is something going
on that is under the surface and that means treachery to President
Taft."14
So it was that the Tribune had to praise Smoot's and the
Herald-Republican's presidential candidate, while condemning both of

13

14

Salt Lake Tribune, July 29, 1912.

Ibid., April 8, 1912.
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them.

It was sometimes difficult, but never a friendly word passed

between these two papers. The following passages further illustrate
the tenor of their exchanges. The Herald-Republican spoke of the
Tribune as follows:
Always ponderous as an elephant and with the ostrich-like
habit of thrusting its head into the sand in the fond belief that
it is entirely hidden, the Tribune clumsily continues its attempts
to destroy the Republican Party. That party in Utah, however, is
still a good risk for the insurance companies. Being opposed by
the Tribune is a badge of respectability for any individual or any
party, and is a guarantee of success. The only irremediable misfortune that might befall the party in Utah would be Tribune
support.15
And the Tribune spoke of the Herald-Republican as follows:
The Smoot organ appears to be much disconcerted over the
present situation in Utah, It disputes the proposition stated by
us that "if President Taft carries Utah it will be because the
Tribune supports him and not because of the vicious, interested,
arrogant, base, pie-counter support rendered him by the organ of
the Federal bunch." This statement, of course, was meant as a
comparison between the effectiveness of the support of the Smoot
organ of the Tribune; for without the Tribune's support. President
Taft would not carry Utah. We believe he will carry the state,
in spite of the evil, interested, and office-seeking support of
the Federal bunch and its organ.16
It is of interest here to note that each paper claimed sole
credit for advancing the Taft cause and denied the other any credit
whatever.
Little attention was paid to Wilson until after his nomination,
but then he came under attack from the Tribune also. He was accused,
among other things, of not being really progressive and of not having
the interests of the West at heart.

15

Herald-Republican, May 10, 1912

16Salt Lake Tribune, July 31, 1912.
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In addition to its fight with the Herald-Republican, the
Tribune was usually at odds with the Peseret News—but for other reasons.
Early in the campaign, the Tribune raised the question of Church influence in politics, and the rather frequent Tribune-Deseret News editorial
exchanges—late in the campaign especially—revolved primarily around
this topic. More will be said concerning this in another chapter.
Editor-in-chief of the Tribune at this time was William Nelson, a nonMormon who had moved to Utah from the East.
While the Deseret News also campaigned for Taft, it did so
rather dispassionately. Using the national news services, as did the
Tribune, its headlines were less biased and the choice of articles was
more fair to all candidates. The editorials were pro-Taft and critical
of Roosevelt, but were much less biting and sarcastic than those of
either the Tribune or the Herald-Republican.

The editors usually

followed the line that no man could do all that Roosevelt had promised,
no matter how hard he tried, so why try a new man when the one in
office was doing an acceptable job.
The News and the Herald-Republican were at odds with each other
on local issues; and it appeared that the editor, J. M. Sjodahl, might
have been a Democrat, or at least an anti-Smoot Republican. As a Churchowned paper, it reflected the Republican views of the Church leaders;
and, in its historic role of defender of the faith, it stoutly supported
the right of those leaders to express their preferences.

It did not,

however, necessarily approve every Republican just because he was a
Mormon. Merrill states that the News was unreliable in Smoot's opinion;
and that while it was supposed to be non-partisan, Smoot felt that it
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was much too critical of him and generally uncooperative. His efforts
17
to change the attitude of the News toward him were unsuccessful.
The Evening Telegram, while favoring Taft, was less critical than
any of the others. Its new articles gave fairly even coverage to all
candidates, and its editorials were usually more subdued.

The editor,

C, C. Goodwin, did suggest, however, that Roosevelt was a tool of the
18
Democrats with the purpose of splitting the Republicans. °
Regardless of their differences and rivalry on local issues,
all of the daily papers (and most of the weeklies) in Salt Lake City
continually filled their pages with pro-Taft material. The approximately one hundred thousand citizens of the city had almost no opportunity
to hear the Democratic or Progressive sides fairly presented.
matter, almost no one in the state did.

For that

Nearly half of the Tribune

Sunday edition was being sent out of the city,

and it may be supposed

that similar quantities of the News and Herald-Republican were also
being read in the rural areas. The result was that this one-sided
approach to the campaign was felt throughout the state. Even Ogden,
with two dailies of its own, seems to have preferred the others. The
editor of the Ogden Standard complained in April that Ogdenltes were
not loyal to the home papers, even though the Standard had spent considerable money to pick up the same news services used by the bigger
papers.
17

Merrill, op_. cit., pp. 172-75.
Evening Telegram, October 15, 1912.

19

Reporting October 5, 1913, the Tribune stated that 15,048
Sunday papers were going out of the city, compared to 18,983 which went
to the city and its suburbs. It is assumed that a proportionate part
of the dailies also were sent out.
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The Standard was the only pro-Roosevelt paper found. Calling
itself the "only champion of the cause of the common people in Utah,"
it was progressive from the start. First LaFollette, then Roosevelt
received its editorial support.

Its news stories were quite fair in

presenting the three sides, and the editorials were usually calm,
Roosevelt's speeches were printed in full, and any new song or slogan
of the Bull Moose was prominently played up. From February to midAugust it referred on its editorial page to the Progressive-Republican
ticket; but with the nomination of Roosevelt, "Republican" was dropped
from the heading.
The Standard carried charges of "thievery" for days after the
Republican Convention and stepped up its assault on Taft.

It stead-

fastly denied that Taft could in any way win. By October it was saying
that since he had no chance, people interested in the tariff should
vote for Roosevelt to get the tariff they wanted.
Wilson, too, was the subject of much discussion.

The criticisms

varied, but centered around charges that he was not what he said he was
and that he said for the record things which he did not believe. In
an editorial on September 10, for instance, it was charged that "his
conduct before the public entitles him to be classified as a friend of
labor for political purposes only."

20

In a town of some 30,000 population, the Standard sold just 3,700
copies daily, indicating that the voice of Progressivism was not heard

20

0gden Standard, September 10, 1912.
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very widely—at least not outside of the immediate area. William
Glassman, owner of the Standard, took an active part in Progressive
Party affairs.
The other Ogden daily was the Examiner, whose stockholders from
April, 1912, on included Governor William Spry and D. C. Jackling, both
of whom had strong connections with the Herald-Republican.

This paper

was quite naturally Republican, although it editorially expressed some
doubt that Taft could win and therefore wished he would not try. Once
he was committed, though, the Examiner supported him. The Examiner
circulation was somewhat less than that of the Standard.
Other newspapers in the state were weeklies and enjoyed very
limited distribution.

Of the sixteen weeklies of which copies were

found, five made no mention of politics,21 eight gave at least limited
coverage to the campaign but took no stand editorially,
were outspokenly Republican.23

2

and three

Two others, referred to in the news-

papers examined, but of which no record was found, were apparently proDemocrat. One was in Provo, where it battled a highly partisan
Republican paper, and the other was in Logan. The combined population
of the two towns was barely more than 16,000.
In summary, nearly everyone who followed the course of the
campaign was forced to do so in the columns of a Republican-oriented
newspaper. Mormon and non-Mormon alike, city people and most country
21
Mines and Methods, Washington County News, Eureka Reporter,
Sprlngville Independent, Tooele Transcript.
22
Wasatch Wave, Mount Pleasant Pyramid, Iron County Record,
Park Record, Coalville Times, Ephraim Enterprise, Spanish Fork Press,
Beaver City Weekly Press.
23
Box Elder Journal, Manti Messenger, Provo Post.

54
people who were told anything at all were told that only Taft and the
Republicans could insure the continued well-being of the state and
the nation. Regardless of how one felt about local politics, a decision
to vote against Taft nationally had to be made on some other basis than
what was read in the newspapers.

CHAPTER V

THE ISSUES
From several of the things mentioned previously, it is evident
that the major campaign issues of 1912 fell into two general groups:
those of a national nature and those of importance primarily in the
state. To the first group belonged the candidates themselves and the
tariff question. The second group included "bossism" and Reed Smoot
and the charge of Mormon Church "interference." There were, of course,
others, but they can be considered in connection with those named.
The most talked about "issue" of all was the candidates. Great
attention was paid to their backgrounds, their reasons for running, the
likelihood of their helping the state if elected, and their political
records to that time. As indicated earlier, most of the discussion was
from a Republican point of view.
President Taft was hailed by the party organs in Utah as the
only logical candidate. He had done a good job, they said, and deserved
the continued support of the party.

In the words of the Ogden Examiner,

"The President has been capable and clean . . . he has been a progressive in the safest and most effective manner . . . his whole service has
been in the genuine interest of the whole people."

Ogden Examiner, May 1, 1912.

This sentiment
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was repeated in various ways and many times by the other Republican
papers during the entire campaign.
That he was progressive was maintained staunchly. It being
pointed out that just a few years earlier Roosevelt had chosen him
personally as the man best able to carry out his progressive program.
Where he had been successful, he was given the credit; where he had
failed, the blame was put on a "contrary" Congress. The Tribune said,
"We believe that he genuinely desires to have the combines and trusts
broken up and protective wages actually paid to American labor."2
Smoot said of him, "President Taft's administration has been fearless,
honest and progressive, and he is entitled to renomination and
election.n°
Taft was claimed as a friend of Utah and the Mormons, and was
credited with having sought and obtained legislation favorable to the
area.

Attention was called particularly to his concern for the Mormons

in Mexico who were being caught up in the revolution there; his support
of a high protective tariff and legislation aiding railroads in the
interior of the country and consequently in Utah; his friendship toward
the members of Congress from Utah; his support of labor legislation
then before the House; and his stand on such things as conservation,
which stand was called progressive by his backers, although his
opponents denied it.4

In short, Taft received the unqualified support

2

3alt Lake Tribune, March 21, 1912.

3

Heraid-Republican, May 12, 1912.

%tah State Republican Platform, quoted in the Salt Lake Tribune,
September 6, 1912. These statements were the subjects of editorials
and news stories nearly every day in the pro-Taft papers before and
after his nomination.
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of the regular Republicans of the state.
Those Republicans who opposed him did so on the grounds that he
was not progressive enough. They charged that he had failed Roosevelt
in not carrying out his programf and that he was disinterested in reform.
Ignoring his progress along reform lines, they accused him of being too
much the agent of the conservative pressure groups and greedy friends.
Nephi L. Morris, Bull Moose candidate for Governor, was quoted as say•
ing that Taft was not a bad man, but that he was in bad company.5 His
record as President was severly criticized, and he was accused of
gross ineptitude in affairs of government.
The Democrats, of course, opposed him on many grounds also—
often paralleling the complaints of the Progressives, His lack (in
their eyes, at least) of real progressive ideas, his association with
the monied interests, his own inefficiency, and the corruption of his
friends disqualified him for office, they said.
Opposition to Roosevelt followed several patterns. First, it
was argued that he should not have a third term—although the News
finally conceded that, technically, this might not be a third term,
since he had only been elected once. The other papers were not so
generous prior to the convention. Much was made of the fact that he had
retired from politics and had even gone out of the country.

Now he was

coming back and trying to crowd in again where he not only was not
needed, but not wanted. However, after his nomination, this issue
5
Ogden Standard, October 7, 1912.
c

Utah State Democratic Platform, quoted in the Tribune, August
30, 1912. These charges were the themes of Democratic speeches throughout the year.

58
received an insignificant amount of attention and appears not to have
been an important factor in his defeat.
His motives for returning were questioned time and again. Editorials demanded why, if Taft had been the right man four years earlier, he
was not still the right man. Acknowledging that Roosevelt had done a
good job, the News wondered why, having not achieved his goal in seven
years in office, he thought he could do it now.

Others, less mildly,

called him a greedy egomaniac, hungry for the power and prestige of
high national office. He was an intruder, they said, bullying his way
to the fore, without regard for anyone else. He was, in fact, a menace
to rational government and must be defeated at all cost. The regular
Republicans added the accusation that he was willfully trying to
destroy the party.
The Roosevelt followers saw him as a crusader returning to the
wars.

Prior to the convention, the Ogden Standard eulogized:

"He

would, with his added years and somewhat wider experience in world
affairs, make the greatest head of a nation the world has ever known.
Q

. . ."

He would pick up the progressive torch where Taft had dropped

it and lead the country to new heights. He had the training, the
ability, the desire and the energy to be a great President; and, above
all else, he was progressive—more progressive, even, than Wilson, He
could and would do the job which they felt needed to be done; and he,
too, had been a friend of Utah.
'Deseret News, August 30, 1912.
8

0gden Standard, January 30, 1912.
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The Democrats in Utah supported Woodrow Wilson as a true
progressive. They talked of his attitude toward the trusts and toward
labor and cited his successful governorship of New Jersey. They
approved his desire to lower the tariff and called him a friend of the
common man.

In their speeches (they lacked newspaper support) they

applauded his attacks on Taft and the conservatives around him.
In reply, both the Republicans and the Progressives accused
Wilson of being an aristocrat, class conscious, and a friend of the
trusts. His present liberalism, they said, was for political reasons
only; and reference was made to his earlier writings in an attempt to
prove these charges. The Republicans also opposed his liberal tariff
views, fearing they would be harmful to the West.
Perhaps because of the previously-shown Republican strength in
the state, the regular Republicans seemed more concerned over Roosevelt
than Wilson. The partisans of Taft and Roosevelt, for whatever reason,
fought each other more bitterly than either of them did the Democrats.
Even after Wilson's nomination, most of the newspapers paid him less
attention than they gave to the other two.
The foregoing were claims and counter-claims with which Utahns
were bombarded daily in the press and by campaign speakers and were all
most people knew of the candidates, having had no personal contact with
any of them.

Even though some 6,000 heard Roosevelt speak in Ogden in

September, and Taft had been in the state earlier in 1912, the large
majority of voters had to depend for all their information on secondhand accounts.
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This being the case, it is doubtful that the actual personalities of the candidates had any important bearing on the outcome of
the voting in Utah. Rather it was the programs that each was reported
to espouse and the above-outlined image of each man built up by the
papers and speakers that influenced large numbers of voters. Remembering the one-sided newspaper alignment, it is evident that far more
people heard only complimentary reports of Taft and derogatory reports
of the other two than heard criticism of Taft and praise of either of
the others. This in itself gave Taft a marked advantage, especially
over Wilson who was virtually unknown in Utah.
Another issue, much discussed nationally and in the state was
the tariff. As stated earlier, many people in the state had reason to
favor a high protective tariff. Congress and President Taft had been
battling over this explosive question during much of his term in office;
Taft had called a special session of the Congress to deal with the
matter in 1909. The result was the Payne-Aldrich tariff which left much
undone, but which Taft signed. The Democrats gained control of the
House in 1910 and almost at once began trying to revise various tariff
schedules downward, only to have their attempts vetoed if they got that
far.

As the controversy moved into 1912, many Utahns were visibly

disturbed.

It was not always that the tariff was too high or too low

that bothered them, but that it was unsettled.

The State Bureau of

Immigration, Labor, and Statistics, for example, in its report on sugar,
commented that tariff agitation had stopped the construction of plants
that might otherwise have been built and added optimistically that "with
the tariff question affecting sugar once eliminated, an opportunity will
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be opened up here to place Utah in a rank equal to Colorado in its
production of this great commodity,"9
Many people in the state, however, would not be content with
simply stabilizing the tariff unless it was stabilized at a high protective level. President Taft was an advocate of the high tariff as
protection to home industry (which was partly his reason for vetoing
the Democratic bills); and the sugar, wool, and mining interests in
Utah applauded his stand with vigor. The Herald-Republican, which was
always outspokenly in favor of the high tariff, editorialized;
Of the tariff record of Mr. Taft in connection with those
products upon which Utah and other western commonwealths depend, but
little need be said. He has Incurred some opposition in the eastern states, whose citizens are consumers rather than producers,
because he has favored the West. Shall this great empire west of
the Mississippi refuse to do as much for Mr. Taft as he has done
for it? 10
The Republican state platform said in part:
The people of Utah, irrespective of party, are vitally interested in the upholding of this policy (protection}. Without it
the profitable cultivation of the sugar beet and the manufacture
of sugar from the beet root would cease, the flocks would be
swept from our hills and plains, our low grade lead and silver
mines would be closed and with other kindred pursuits would
disappear from the industrial life of Utah.11
Roosevelt, who was somewhat less dedicated to protection, and
Wilson, who favored tariff for revenue only, frightened men engaged in
or dependent on the then protected industries referred to. The Ogden
Examiner, in giving its allegiance to Taft, stated: "This state needs
9

State of Utah, Immigration, Labor, and Statistics Report, p. 178.
Herald-Republican, May 12, 1912.
Salt Lake Tribune, September 6, 1912.
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at least the present degree of protection in order that its industries
may not be crippled."12

The Herald-Republican added, ". . . as to the

tariff for revenue only or free trade theories of the Democracy, the
West has never approved them and never will. . . ."13
The Democrat-supported Underwood Tariff Bill, which was introduced in Congress early in 1912, caused much consternation in Utah
business circles. Taft had set up a Tariff Commission two years
earlier to study and report to him the various phases of the tariff.
He refused during 1911 to approve any tariff measure until he had heard
the report of the Commission.

As he continued this policy until 1912,

he met with increasing opposition in the Democrat-controlled Congress.
The Underwood Committee, ignoring the Tariff Commission, wrote bills
covering a variety of items and, one at a time, began pushing them through
Congress.
The controversy over what was to be done with the tariff lasted
beyond the election and was followed carefully in the Utah newspapers.
The use of the Tariff Commission was seen as a business-like approach
to the matter, and the Democrat's lowering of rates without consulting
it was decried.

Indeed, the lowering of them under any condition

brought cries of anguish from many Utahns.
March 2, a Democratic caucus in the House approved a bill to
put sugar on the free list, although the bill was angrily opposed by
Democrats from sugar states. The response in Utah was immediate. The

12

0gden Examiner. July 7, 1912.
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Ogden Standard of March 4 said in an article:
The Underwood bill, providing for free entry of sugar, has caused
consternation among Utah beet sugar producers, nearly all of whom
feel that the suspension of the sugar tariff would force them to
abandon the cultivation of beets in this district.14
David Eccles, President of the Amalgamated Sugar Company, was
quoted as saying:
The Underwood Bill sounds the death knell of the beet industry.
It rewards the eastern sugar refineries by giving them cheap
foreign sugar, and punishes the western beet farmers by discriminating against the beet industry.1^
Figures were given to show that tariff-free sugar could be obtained from
Cuba for less than the farmers were being given in the state.
On the other hand, the Tribune, perhaps as a slap at the Church
sugar interests which it had criticized before, insisted that the dropping of the sugar tariff would not destroy the industry, but only cut
the dividends of the big companies, which, it said, were too high
16

anyway.

The House formally passed the sugar bill on March 15 and sent
it on to the Senate. The Senate had already started work on a more
moderate sugar bill of its own, which it was hoped; the President would
sign in preference to the House bill (thus appeasing those who demanded
a reduction, but not really hurting anyone).

The Senate bill, passed

July 28, lowered duties from $1.90 to $1.60 per hundredweight and so was
more to the liking of Utahns. T. R. Cutler, General Manager of the

l4
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Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, was quoted as saying.
While we naturally regret to see the existing tariff interfered
with, still the beet sugar industry would not be seriously hurt
by the adoption of the Senate measure. . , . The beet sugar
industry is vitally interested in the final outcome of this
conflict.17
As it developed, neither the House nor the Senate would back
down sufficiently from its own position for a compromise to be reached.
The whole question was stalemated through the remainder of that session,
and nothing came of it.
A tariff bill for wool had been vetoed by President Taft in 1911
because the Tariff Commission had not made a report on the matter at
that time. By 1912 a report had been made, and President Taft asked
for a wool bill based on its findings. The Underwood Committee, however, rejected the report on the grounds that its basic premises were
erroneous and therefore its recommendations were of no value. With
minor changes the 1911 bill was reintroduced in the House in March and
passed on April 1, The bill called for a simple ad valorum duty of
20 per cent, which amounted to an average reduction of 42 per cent from
the old rates.18
Again there was concern in Utah, although some sheepmen seemed
unworried.

James H. Moyle, recently resigned chairman of the Democratic

Central Committee and a prominent sheep man, had published a letter in
the Tribune in which he maintained that 20 per cent ad valorum would
leave "a substantial amount of protection." He also upheld the

17
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Democrats in their desire to lower the rates.19

(It should be added

that fellow Democrats in neighboring states did not share his opinion.)
The He raId-R epub1ican immediately accused him of favoring a tariff when
it was in danger, and then deserting when it was quite certain that
20
Republicans would save it.
The bill passed the Senate on July 27 and was sent to the
President on August 5. He quickly vetoed it. In his message he stated:
I stand by my pledge to maintain a degree of protection to offset the differences in cost of production here and abroad and will
heartily approve any bill reducing duties to this level.
Most of the rates in the submitted bill are so low in themselves
that if enacted into law the inevitable result would be irretrievable injury to the wool growing industry, the enforced idleness of
much wool combing and spinning machinery and of thousands of looms
and the consequent throwing out of employment of thousands of
workmen.21
The House just as quickly overrode the veto, but the Senate
refused to do so and the wool bill died.
A tariff measure on metals, including lead, had been passed by
the House on January 29, and by the Senate on May 30. This, too, was
criticized in Utah; and when it was finally vetoed in August for lack
of a Tariff Commission study, Taft was congratulated.

The House again

overrode the veto, but the Senate balked and the bill died.
The failure of these three bills added to the stature of
President Taft in the eyes of many Utahns. He had proven that he was
indeed a friend,
iy
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Who causes all the crops to grow?
Reed Smoot.
Who makes the seasons come and go?
Reed Smoot.
Who shapes the current of events?
Who regulates the elements?
Who takes the place of Providence?
Reed Smoot.22
The sarcasm in this bit of verse does not keep it from showing
something of the illustrious positon occupied by Senator Smoot in 1912.
As a United States Senator, and a friend of presidents, he had acquired
in a few short years considerable influence and importance nationally.
Traveling in the highest political circles, he gained prestige and
popularity which stood him in good stead both in the Senate and at home.
Although somewhat indebted to Roosevelt for his Senate seat, he was
convinced that Roosevelt was wrong to enter the campaign and gave Taft
his not inconsiderable support in 1912. As a senator, he was conservative, and he made no apologies for it.
The head of the dominant party in Utah for some ten years past,
he was undoubtedly the strongest political figure in the state. To
the satisfaction of his friends and the irritation of his enemies, he
directed the affairs of his party with skill and a firm hand.
A Mormon, Smoot had been a member of the Church's highest
governing body, excepting the Presidency, since 1900,

In this position,

he had traveled throughout the state and was well known. Even among
those Mormons who opposed him politically, he was welcomed in his
religious capacity. As an Apostle, he met frequently with the heads of
22
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67
the Church and joined in their councils. Among his close friends he
counted President Joseph F, Smith and several others of the Church's
top men.
Prominent in business circles since his early twenties, Smoot
by 1912 had considerable wealth and wide financial Interests, After
starting out in the wool business, he had expanded his investments to
mining, banking, stock raising, sugar, and other concerns.
With a habit of success—in politics, in his church, in businessReed Smoot was Indeed a man to be reckoned with, especially in Utah.
Smoot was personally admired and respected in Utah. His concern
for the Mormons in Mexico, and his sponsoring and backing of bills
beneficial to Utah groups added to the esteem in which he was held in
1912.

That President Taft should consent to visit such a relatively

small state, which he had done earlier, was also laid to the credit of
Senator Smoot. Smoot was recognized as a prodigious worker, both in the
Senate and at home, and no job seemed too big for him.

Not a good

speaker, he made up in organization and preparation what he lacked as
an orator.
His early contact with the wool industry had given Smoot an
interest in tariff protection and had impelled him toward the Republican
party.

Later developments did nothing to lessen his convictions in that

regard, and he became a staunch friend of protection. After stating
that Smoot believed 100 per cent in protection by means of the tariff,
23
Merrill adds, "The senator's beliefs were fundamental—not political."

23Merrill, o£. cit., p. 357
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And speaking of his special regard for sugar, he says:
The protectionist philosophy which he nurtured would not account
wholly for the fervor he exhibited for sugar. Sugar beets were
grown in Utah on a reasonably important scale. Daring much of Smoot's
senatorial career, sugar beets were the principal cash crop of the
Utah farmer of irrigated land. But it was not only the Utah farmers
who were interested in sugar. Utah capital was invested in sugar
manufacturing. Further, it was not only Utah capital that was
invested, but it was the Mormon Church capital in considerate degree
. . . . All of the three eminent churchmen with whom Smoot cooperated most closely , . , were sugar men in greater or lesser degree
. . . . To many the relationship suggested an insidious and dangerous
type of church influence in politics. To Smoot's mind there was no
issue. He was following a course which he would have followed under
any circumstances. The fact that the Church leaders approved the
course and would have directed him to it if he were not already
there, was merely substantiation of their good judgment. . . .
As indicated earlier, the tariff question was prominent in the
campaign, and Smoot spoke out for protectionism on every opportunity.
Smoot's influence and strength in Utah cannot be denied.
Because of them, he himself was to some extent a campaign issue. His
enemies outside the Church made much of his dual position as Senator
and Apostle, and accused him of exerting undue pressure on other Church
leaders to bend them to his will.

He was credited with—or blamed for—

having caused the political turn which the October Confernce of the
Mormon Church took and was said to have pursuaded President Smith to
write his controversial editorial (discussed in Chapter VI). 2 5
Mormons and non-Mormons alike protested his control of the party.
B. H. Roberts, as temporary chairman of the Democratic state convention.

?4
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said:
Utah is known to be the worst boss-ridden and trust-bound state
of the Union. . . . Locally the state is in the control of a
political machine that shames all precedent, but is worthy of the
Congressional delegation who constitute its head. . . . Everything
must be considered and acted upon with reference to the effect
upon this political machine. . . . The election of all officers in
the state . . , must be made to subserve this same end—the
strengthening of the machine.26
A Progressive resolution complained:
Such conditions in the nation are insufferable, and conditions in
this state are no better. From a party devoted to social service
the Republican party of our state has become dominated by an
aggregation of persons banded together for personal ambitions.
Those persons have throttled the most beneficial and humane
legislation. They have manipulated conventions, dictated platforms and named tickets without regard to the voice of the people.
We have remained patient under these and many other abuses, striving for reform within the party, but all hope of such reform has
long since passed away-2
Progressive Governor Hiram Johnson, speaking in Utah, rather
mildly took up the charge thusly:
Have we bosses in Utah? For four years at least, I have been
convinced that we have. Our bosses in Utah, however, are above
the average of bosses in other states, I think they are considerably superior to the average bosses . . . no charge of graft or
bribery can be brought against them. They have not used money
unlawfully. I am certain that the conspicuous bosses in the state
have not been the recipients of one tainted dollar. But they
have held office and done that with considerable success. As I
understand it, the affairs of their offices have been well
administered.^8
Then after accusing the "bosses" of dumping the previous
governor, who deserved another term (he said), in favor of the present
governor, he added:

"Of late those bosses have been less active in

26
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politics, but they have nevertheless been able to continue to dictate
the political destinies of the state.'*29
The Salt Lake Tribune took frequent opportunity to run down the
"Federal bunch" editorially and otherwise.
How many people voted for or against Taft because of their feelings about Reed Smoot would be impossible to guess. This writer believes
that those voters who were swayed either way by Smoot (because he was
Smoot) were far fewer in number than those who were influenced either
way by some other campaign question.

In other words, those who favored

Taft solely because Smoot did, or those who opposed Taft because of
Smoot), the former was substantially larger. The writer feels that
there were too many other issues on which to base a choice for one m a n even Reed Smoot—to have been a decisive factor.

(In a campaign with

no important issues and no strong feelings, as prestigious a man as
Smoot could have been the decisive element, carrying a large block of
votes because of his own appeal. Such appears not to have been the case
in 1912.)
This is not to say that Smoot did not exert considerable
influence. On the contrary; but he did it by convincing voters that
President Taft believed in the things that would benefit them.

In his

newspaper and in his public speeches, he constantly reiterated this
contention until people supported Taft because they thought he was the
right man, and not simply because Smoot had told them to. Those who
opposed Taft did so believing that he was not the right man, and not

29
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because they didn't like Smoot. Evidence of this can be found in the
strong support given Taft by bitter enemies of Smoot and in the fact
that Church associates of Smoot were found in both the other parties.
Yet another factor in the campaign was party loyalty and an
inherent dislike among many Republicans of a third party. There is
reason to believe that many Utah Republicans who voted for Taft would
have preferred Roosevelt, and—had he received the nomination—would
have gladly voted for him. When he went against the party and seemed
30

bent on "destroying" it, however, they chose the party over the man.
As the campaign moved into the final two or three weeks,

attention shifted more to the local scene and the state government came
under fire. Governor Spry was accused of misuse of funds. He had, it
was claimed, put state money in a bank where it would draw no interest
and of whose board of directors he was a member. The charge was denied,
and no evidence was produced either way.
It was also charged that the railroads in Utah were finding
preferred treatment by the national and state Republicans by means of
money and other favors. They were not, it was said, paying enough
taxes compared to other Western states. The Ogden Standard seemed to
have started the debate, but it spread to the Republican Salt Lake
papers which immediately took up the challenge. Figures were quoted by
both sides "proving" conflicting claims. Just before the election, the
State Board of Equalization, made up of two Democrats and two
on

Individuals who voted in 1912 to whom the writer spoke
expressed this belief. The fact that Roosevelt was splitting the party
was often mentioned in the press. Supra, p. 58.
31
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Republicans, published an open letter in the News giving the correct
figures which showed that Utah assessments actually exceeded those of
other Western states.

This didn't settle the problem, however, and

the election came with no final answer having been accepted.
These were the issues of the campaign of 1912. A final
evaluation of them will be attempted in a later chapter.

32
Deseret News, November 2, 1912,

CHAPTER VI
THE "CHURCH INTERFERENCE" QUESTION

A bitterly fought campaign issue which perhaps could have been
avoided was that of whether the Mormon Church was interfering in state
politics.

This had been a charge made by the American Party during its

short life and by earlier non-Mormons. The fighting between the Church
and the non-Mormons over this question, carried mainly in the columns
of the Deseret News and the Salt Lake Tribune, reached bitter heights
in the 1908 campaign, but in the succeeding two or three years it
subsided.

Coming into 1912, the battlefield was relatively quiet in

this regard, perhaps because both groups were politically of one mind.
Unfortunately, the truce, if such it was, didn't last. A random shot
in April was followed by more than four months during which attention
was on other things. Then in September and October the opponents took
up arms in earnest.

It will be of interest now to pursue the course

taken by each side.
For no apparent reason, save perhaps from habit, the Tribune
unburdened itself just prior to the spring Mormon conference as follows:
It is not likely that any particular or significant public
deliverance will be given at this conference . » . it would be
desirable, indeed, if the First Presidency would give out and the
Conference sustain a positive and vigorous rule that would keep
all of the general officials of the Church out of politics and
forbid them "counseling" or lending the weight of their ecclesiastical authority either for oi against any political party, or on
the action of their membership with respect to civil affairs. No
doubt this sort of deliverance will come some time, but we do not
expect it this year. It must come, however, eventually, because
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the control of politics and civil affairs by ecclesiastical
authority is something that is so foreign and repugnant to American
ideals that it cannot last as a permanent proposition in this
country.1
The only comment with even mild political implications came when
Anthony W. Ivins referred to President Taft as a just, wise man of peace
who would not permit the country to become Involved in war with Mexico,
in spite of the difficulties then existing between the two countries.
(Among other things, the Mormons in Mexico were being seriously
harassed by revolutionary forces, and the United States Government was
attempting to help them return safely to this country.) No one took
exception to Ivins' statement.
The next foray came late in August, when the Tribune quoted
from the Boston Globe a biting reference to Church control of the
Republican party.

The News did not reply.

Subsequent Tribune editorials had two main objectives: the first,
to chastise the Church for any appearance of interference; and the second,
to seize any suggestion that what the Church leaders said was not binding
on the membership. The Deseret News took the stand that any man had a
right to voice an opinion and that Church leaders who stated a preference
were doing only that. Therefore, the people were free to do as they
themselves saw fit.

In spite of the seeming agreement of these two

positions, and in spite of the fact that the Tribune backers stood to
profit from any Republican votes the Church might secure, their

•J-Salt Lake Tribune, April 5, 1912.
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longstanding animosity toward the Church would not let them be quiet.
While pleading for the right of each individual to vote his preference,
the Tribune consistently branded the News' contention that he could, as
a lie.
The first exchange in September concerned a speech by Francis M.
Lyman, of the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles, at a stake conference, in
which he specifically told each person to vote his own choice. After
noting the content of the speech, the Tribune added:
It was, as reported to us, a good, square, impartial talk, quite
inoffensive politically, and morally strengthening to individual
purpose.
But the chief value of President Lyman's sentiments is in the
indication which it affords that no one will be authorized this
year to play upon the loyalty of Mormons to their Church by
"counseling" them that "the will of the brethren" is for the
election of one candidate or another, thus freeing them all to vote
as they choose,3
The News retorted the following day that, of course, what Lyman
had said was true, and added that no one had ever been authorized "to
play upon the loyalty of Mormons to their Church" for political reasons.
An article datelined Provo, September 9, was printed in both
the Tribune and the Ogden Standard, saying that "Apostle-Senator Reed
Smoot" in addressing a conference had gotten into a eulogy of President
Taft,

According to the article, many took exception to politics in a

religious meeting, and a few had gotten up and left.
The single item which generated the most heat was an editorial
published in the Improvement Era, the official magazine of the Church,
over the signature of President Joseph F. Smith. Reaching the public

3
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the last week in September, it brought a storm of protest. A portion
of the text follows:
The forthcoming presidential election is one of profound importance, and opens to the student a wide field for the study of
applied political economy as well as for leading social questions
that are before the nation to be solved.
No reasonable citizen who has investigated the political
situation, with a view to learning the true status of the claims
set forth by the various political parties, can in any way justly
find fault with the present administration. President William H.
Taft has met the just needs of the people and economic demands of
the country with steadfastness and wisdom. In the treatment of
the great questions that have come before the nation, he has
risen to the occasion and applied such conservative legal remedies
as have won him true admiration from patriotic citizens of all
parties.
The extremely delicate situation with Mexico has been handled
by him in a way to establish confidence in his ability, and notwithstanding the criticism of his action, in this matter and in that
of the Central American republics, time will doubtless prove that
his policy is best, , . . Everything considered, the administration
has dealt properly with this very delicate situation. The colonists
who were driven out were well treated by our government, being
provided in their extremity in great kindness, with food and means.
The only charge of any consequence that the opponents of
President Taft bring against him is that he has been and is the
tool of the "interests," which means doubtless that he unduly favors
"big business," or trusts. His administration has proved the
contrary and the careful student will find that he has done as much
to regulate the trusts as was ever done by any other incumbent of
the presidential chair and he has done it legally. He believes
strictly in the judicial application of the law in these cases,
and as firmly as anyone in the need of just and fair laws to deal
with the important question. It is a perplexing problem which not
even the experts know just how to handle, and which can not be
solved by a mere change of presidents. Pres. Taft believes in
finding out what is necessary, then applying the law as a remedy
without resort to unconstitutional means, to lawlessness and
anarchy. This has been his policy, and what he has accomplished
has been effective without being revolutionary and illegal.
At no time has the country been more prosperous than now and
as far as politics may affect prosperity, the people of the country
have no occasion to complain at the administration on this matter.
So that, on the whole, whatever may be the outcome of the people's
choice, it is clear that President William H, Taft has made a good
president, and his administration hals^Beeh a success. Should the
people call him once again to the presidential chair, it is not
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likely that they will regret it, but, on the contrary, will find
their action wise, sensible and sound.
Joseph F. Smith4
The Tribune of September 26, quoted part of the editorial and
added:
That will certainly be reassuring to the supporters of Taft
in Utah, and in all of the communities where President Smith's
word carries special weight, D u Q while it will be satisfactory
to the Taft men, how about the other fellows?5
The Ogden Standard mentioned the matter briefly the 26th, and
on the 27th wrote:
[The editorial] . . . we trust is not intended as an expression of the church, but rather as the individual utterance of the
distinguished leader who always has been a strong Republican
partisan. We would feel deeply aggrieved if a less radical
Republican, occupying the presidency of the Church, saw fit to
commend the candidacy of Taft, but Jos. F. Smith's Republicanism
is so deep-dyed that but few will mistake it to be the voice
of the church or other than the personal opinion of one of strong
conviction who is for his party though the heavens fall.
The word spread fast, and on the 27th, the News felt constrained
to clarify the situation.

Its editors stated:

LTheJ editorial . . . we understand, caused a great deal of
comment among local politicians, and some have construed it as an
evidence of Church interference in politics.
President Joseph F. Smith, today authorized us to say that he
alone assumes responsibility for the views expressed in the article
referred to. It , . • was not intended as anything but the
expression of his personal regard for the President of the United
States and his personal opinion of the policy of the administration.
It is not meant as a declaration of the political faith of the
Church. President Smith added emphatically that, as an American
citizen, he considered himself as much entitled to hold and express

^Joseph F. Smith* "The Coming Election," Improvement Era, XV
(October, 1912), 1121-22.
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his personal views as any official of this, or any other church,
or his friends or his critics.
The President of the Church, stated, further, that there is no
intention on the part of the Church authorities to interfere in
politics, nor would there be any interference in behalf of any
political party . . . .
During this campaign the Church has no candidates and does
not advocate the success or defeat of any political party. The
editorial referred to must not be taken as, or used as, a
declaration of political preference by the Church.7
A Tribune editorial of September 27 insisted that when President
Smith wrote in the Improvement Era, an official Church publication, he
was not speaking simply as an individual, but as the leader of the
Mormon Church, with all the powers claimed by him as such. By the 28th
the Tribune had its editorial guns really warmed up as it summarized
conditions thusly:
The editorial . , . was the sensation of the day in this
community yesterday. The emphatic endorsement of President Taft
contained in that editorial was construed to be a guidance to
thousands of Mormons who looked to the head of the church for
directions in their politics as in everything else . . . . It
will undoubtedly affect the vote,
. . . the Roosevelt following here . . .will undoubtedly be
extremely resefltfujL of this editorial. . . . The Democrats who are
free from church fetters will also resent that editorial and those
who have been claiming that the aggression which has kept the
people in a state of agitation for decades has come from sensational newspapers, and that the church and church leaders have
been the victims in place of assailants, will be put to confusion
and shame. For here is a case of a political bomb dropped from a
clear sky. There was nothing to call for it so far as is known;
there was no agitation against the church, there was no [jmtichurcJT] party . . . . In fact, it had been hoped and supposed
that they would this year keep out of politics. But here President
Smith comes into the fight as a partisan . . . and lends the weight
of his powerful position to the support of the Republican candidate.
While the Tribune is anxious to see Mr. Taft re-elected and
commends every sentiment uttered in his favor, it has serious
criticism upon the wisdom of President Smith's course, . . ,°
7
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After soundly berating President Smith further for allegedly
stirring up an otherwise peaceful scene, the editors close with the
following printed in capitals:
Although the Era article may be exasperating to Democrats and
Progressives, it is humiliating to thousands of Taft supporters
who have felt that Utah's place in the Taft column was assured
without resorting to measures which invariably do the state more
harm than anybody's election would do it good. However, no one
now doubts that Taft will carry Utah,9
Politicians quickly became involved. Joseph J. Cannon, MormoB
temporary chairman of the Progressive county and legislative conventions,
in his opening speech on September 28 discussed the matter. He reported
that the Democratic Party had referred the editorial to the national
party, and that some had suggested reviving the American Party, He
then stated his conviction that there was no attempt being made to
direct Mormon votes, and that each was free to vote for whomever he
chose. He denied any desire on the part of the Church heads to sway
any votes, and said he had been told this by President Smith himself.
At a Progressive rally in Logan, Nephi L. Morris, candidate for Governor,
and a stake president, told his audience that voters should not be
intimidated by the editorial.11
I
The controversy continued over the editorial until the semiannual Mormon conference held October-4-6 afforded new material for
discussion. The major speeches of the Conference were carried in all
of the papers, and the editorial fighting was intense.
9
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A difference of opinion existed even among the leaders of the
Church as to the extent to which the Church could or ought to give
counsel for the guidance of Church members. Democrat Brigham H. Roberts
in his speech divided things into two groups: the essential and the
non-essential. All Church members should heed Church advice, and Church
advice should be given in the area of essentials, he said; but when it
came to non-essentials, where every man's judgment may be as good as .
another's, liberty and tolerance should exist.

In the area of non-

essentials, he included commercial and industrial affairs and "civil
government ."^
At the end of the meeting in which Roberts spoke. President Smith
made some remarks. He believed, he said, in all that had been stated,
but he also believed a little further. Most of the mistakes made in the
world were in the area of liberty and personal judgment, he claimed.
All men should use great care not to abolish or change the things "which
God has willed and has inspired to be done. Even in the realms of freedom and the exercise of their own judgment, they may individually go
unto God in faith and prayer, and find out what should guide and direct
13
their human judgment and wisdom. . . ."
The following day. President Charles W. Penrose, counselor to
President Smith, rather pointedly discoursed on "Inspiration." Some
excerpts from his speech follow:
12
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Report of the 83rd
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Indeed, I do not know anything that is really true and that is
divine that is not essential, • . .
And we should have our eyes open to the light and willing to receive
good counsel and good advice, and to hearken to the voice of the
Lord through the appointed channel,
>. • . .
Now we should be very careful when we hear the word of the Lord,
to receive it and to obey it, and we should be very careful when
men utter their own opinions and ideas, whether in regard to the .
principles of the Gospel or to anything that pertains to the welfare
of the human family, about accepting it. . • .
It is the right and privilege of the man who stands at the head
to give forth his opinions and his views. . . . If at any time he
tries to enforce his private opinions upon others by way of edicts
against them, by ecclesiastical force, by physical force, by any
pains or penalties, that will be another thing; but that hasn't
occurred in our history as far as I know, and I will support my
brethren with whom I am associated in pointing out the truth as
they see it, and exposing the wrong as they understand it, and in
trying to convince and convert those who go astray to come into
the right path, that good government may prevail; that is our
privilege.14
Both Smith and Penrose seemed to be saying that while an individual is entirely free to make up his own mind with regard to anything,
he should be careful not to reject what may be superior—even inspiredwisdom.
The Tribune and the Ogden Standard ran critical editorials about
these views; and the News, as usual, defended the right of the Church men
to have expressed them. The Standard seemed less interested than the
Tribune in embarrassing the Church, and on October 8 printed an interview with then Apostle David 0. McKay. He was quoted as saying that
the Church leaders had a right to differ among themselves and to
express themselves.

14

Ibid., pp. 62-68.
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The Church doctrine accords every man and woman his free agency
and that right shall not be abridged. President Smith and Apostle
Penrose firmly believe in the representative form of government,
while Elder Roberts is more Democratic and he believes that the
people should more directly voice their political sentiments.
Many differ on the political question and every person, in or
out of the Church has the right to voice his honest convictions
pertaining to it. I do not think the talks were made for political
effect, and yet I think it rather unfortunate that the subject was
brought up at this time, on the eve of a political campaign.15
Additional charges of interference were made and denied in
editorials similar to those cited during the remainder of the campaign,
although they became less frequent toward the end.

Summary
How much influence did this campaign by-play have on the voters
of Utah?

An exact answer is, of course. Impossible.

The best this

writer can do is to make a cautious estimate.
From the foregoing, two conclusions can be readily reached.
First, that the Church presidency approved of the Taft administration
and desired his re-election. Their own statements suggest that they
considered this the wise and proper course, and that Church members
would do well to heed their council. Second, that in spite of this open
invitation to Church members to vote Republican, the way was left wide
open for them to reject it if they chose. Church leaders themselves
reiterated their right to express an "opinion," and they repeatedly
denied that these "opinions" were in any way binding on the membership.
Over and over it was stated that each individual should and did have the
right to form his own conclusions, and that the Church in no way wanted
to dictate how its members should vote. Democratic and Progressive
15

0gden Standard, October 8, 1912.
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leaders, who were Mormons in good standing, opposed, and encouraged
opposition to, the political beliefs of the Presidency, Church members
were told time and again by their party leaders, by News editorials,
and by high Church officials to vote their own convictions. There was
no anti-Mormon persecution or other force outside the Church to cause
the members to band together, as had been the case other years.
It must be supposed that some, perhaps many. Mormons were persuaded to vote Republican by the expressed views of their president.
Many others must have voted for Taft because of personal preference
based on other considerations. However, certain figures

available

for that year indicate a large-scale disregaid by Mormons both of
Taft and of his supporters among Church officials.
Population and Church membership figures for 1912 show that
approximately 75 per cent of the inhabitants of the state were Mormons.
It can be assumed that approximately that same percentage of the voters
of the state were likewise Mormons. Nevertheless, President Taft
garnered only 37.4 per cent of the Utah vote.

It must be assumed that

this figure includes some non-Mormon votes—probably a large number of
them.

If the above assumptions are correct, it must be concluded that

at least half, and probably more than half, of the Mormon voters did
not vote for Taft. However, Taft won by a plurality of only 5,434
votes out of 112,280. It seems not unreasonable that that many
undecided voters might have been picked up by the comments of the

16

3tate of Utah, Report of the Secretary of State, 1904, 1908,
1911-1912, pp. 176-77; and State of Utah, Immigration, Labor and "
Statistics Report, pp. 254-55, 268.
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Church leaders, in which case it might be claimed that the Church swung
the election. However, this is not the final answer, as will be shown
in Chapter VIII.

CHAPTER VII
THE CAMPAIGN
Utah moved into 1912 completely in the hands of the Republicans
as far as the state and national offices were concerned, and party
leaders in the state seemed confident that such would continue to be
the case. With Senator Smoot at its head—and backed up by Senator
George Sutherland, Congressman Joseph Howell, and Governor William
Spry—the party organization began working smoothly for another victory.
At the outset, Taft and the Republicans seemed the favorites, but as
Roosevelt eased himself into the contest, ripples of dissension began
to form and party leaders began to worry.
In late January and February, the newspapers were following the
movement toward Roosevelt with great interest and, usually, alarm.
Only the Ogden Standard could find any joy in Roosevelt's announcement
of candidacy, and it believed that Utah progressives would unite behind
him.1
William Jennings Bryan spoke in Ogden on February 26—and while
his speech was not primarily political, he managed to count out both of
the Republicans as possible winners in November.*

A second speech,

given in Salt Lake City the same day, turned into a denunciation in

1

0gden Standard, February 23, 1912.

2

Ibid., February 26, 1912.

some detail of Roosevelt and the Taft administration.^
From February to June, as the two Republican candidates battled
through the primaries, Utah partisans for both men foresaw certain
victory in the national convention.
Political activity in the state grew apace.

In March and April,

Roosevelt clubs began to spring up around the state, beginning first in
Ogden; April and May saw the calling of mass meetings in several localities.

In mid-March, C. E, Loose, friend and political associate of

Reed Smoot, and Republican state chairman, resigned as president of the
pro-Taft Herald-Republican, an expression of his preference for
Roosevelt.

Roosevelt forces made a determined effort to send their

men to the state convention and were successful fairly often. Confidence ran high; and much was made of the victories, although they
usually represented a very small vote.
Early in April, the Republican State Central Committee formally
endorsed Taft as the party nominee, but there was real concern that the
Roosevelt threat could be disastrous. Thomas Kearns, returning from
the East, reported that if the party didn't overcome its differences,
it would lose the election.5

An appeal was made by Smoot, Sutherland,

Howell, and Spry—in May—that Utah delegates to the convention be
instructed for Taft.6

°Deseret News, February 27, 1912.
4

Salt Lake Tribune, March 13, 1912.

5

Ibid., May 3, 1912.

6
Herald-Republican, May 6, 1912.

87
In the midst of the Republican struggle in the state for control
of the party, attention shifted briefly to the Democrats, whose state
convention for the choosing of national delegates was held May 14.
Adopting a platform very like the national—calling for direct primaries,
direct election of senators, lower tariffs, labor laws, and most of the
nationally debated reforms—the convention instructed its delegates
only that they "support progressive candidates and all our progressive
measures,""
The following day the Republicans met in Convention and the Taft
forces successfully carried the field.

In spite of a vigorous attempt

by the Roosevelt wing to block instruction, the delegates were pledged
to vote for Taft. Among the delegates were the four state officeholders—-Smoot; Spry; Sutherland; Howell; and C. E. Loose, the only
Roosevelt partisan in the group.8

The platform was mainly an affirma-

tion of allegiance to the party and a vote of approval for Taft's
administration, and for the work of the senators, the representative,
and Governor Spry.

It also favored a tariff policy that would protect

home industry.
As national convention preliminaries got underway, apprehension
rose in both groups in the state. C. E. Loose, pledged to Taft, nevertheless voted for the Roosevelt man for convention chairman, which
action brought him both praise and criticism from party members at
7
'Ogden Standard, May 14, 1912, Delegates to the Democratic
National Convention with 1/2 vote apiece were: John S. Bransford,
C. P. Overfield, C, C, Neslen, John Dern, Samuel Russell, J. C. Call,
Joseph E. Cardon, John R, Barnes, George Whitmore, H. L, Nielson,
John McAndrew, Thomas N. Taylor, William Roylance, E. M. Brown, and
A, L. Brewer,
o

Additional delegates to the Republican National Convention
were C. R. Hollingsworth, Jacob Johnson, and J. N. Peterson.
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home.

Newspapers on both sides declared that Roosevelt would surely

bolt if defeated; and again some cheered the prospect, while other
jeered.
When Taft won. Loose resigned as state chairman, saying that he
had supported Roosevelt because he thought it was right. Now he didn't
feel that he should be on a committee trying to elect Taft.^ He was
duly replaced and became a leader in the Progressive camp.
In spite of the drawn-out balloting in the Democratic National
Convention, there did not seem to be in Utah the interest in it that
had prevailed during the Republican meeting. This might have been a
reflection of the newspaper bias, although the papers did give full
coverage to the happenings. While the Salt Lake papers did not favor
any candidate, the Ogden Standard kept boosting the progressives among
the Democrats. Utah's delegates, uninstructed, voted for Wilson § i to
l i for Clark until the last ballotA meeting of Progressives in Salt Lake on July 23 brought
representatives from the "principal counties," and showed "strong"
sentiment in Weber, Summit, Sanpete, Salt Lake, Rich, Davis, Juab, and
Tooele Counties, Some counties already had named a full ticket of
Progressives, Steps were made toward calling a state convention and a
|5,000 campaign fund was raised.1®
The Progressives met again July 27, this time in Provo, and for
the purpose of naming delegates to the national convention.11

At that

9

Heraid-Republican, June 24, 1912.

10

0gden Standard, July 3, 1912.

•^Delegates to the Progressive National Convention were J. H,
Mays, S. B, Tuttle, N, A, Robertson, Glen R. Bothwell, Mrs. Charles J.
Adams, Preston G. Peterson, F. F. Schade, Wesley K. Walton, They took
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time it was also decided to put up a full slate of candidates for the
state offices, A platform was adopted which outlined the abuses of
the Republican "machines," both national and local, and which called for
a return to rule by the people.

It stated that since the Democrats

were not progressive enough to handle the nation's problems, there was
clear need for a new party.
Following their national convention, the Wilson forces began
to move in the state, organizing clubs and holding rallies.
Hiram Johnson, Progressive Governor of California, arrived in
Utah late in August and spoke for Roosevelt in both Ogden and Salt
Lake, He was generally well-received; and because he scolded the
"bosses," even the Tribune wrote him up favorably.
On August 29, the state Democrats nominated a ticket with
John F, Tolton of Beaver for Governor and Attorneys Mathonihah Thomas,
Of Salt Lake, and Tillman D. Johnson, of Ogden, for Represenatives to
Congress,

(For the first time, Utah was entitled to two Congressmen.)

A detailed platform was adopted which applauded Wilson; deplored the
inefficiency of Taft and the corruption of his friends; berated the
state Republicans for machine politics, misuse of state funds,
suspected graft in the State Land Board; and urged a non-partisan
judiciary, health and safety laws, a direct primary, labor laws, conservation, a tariff revision downward, and more firmness toward Mexico.13

no special part in the Convention, Freeman Morningstar was appointed
at a later time„
12

Deseret News, July 28, 1912.

13
Salt Lake Tribune, August 30, 1912.
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During the first days of September, most of the papers reported
the results of a "careful and impartial" canvass of the state, which
showed that the Republicans would probably carry the entire state—but
by reduced margins. Only Salt Lake County was held in doubt, the
Democrats being strong there

The Progressives were given no chance to

win, but it was felt they would make the other contests closer.14
The state Republican Convention, September 5, nominated Congressman Joseph Howell, of Cache County, for a fifth terra and gave the other
position to Judge Jacob Johnson, of Sanpete. Governor William Spry, a
personable and politically astute cattle man from Tooele, was duly renominated. The proceedings seemed to be routine. A short platform
was approved which praised national and state office-holders; pointed
to progressive labor legislation passed by the Senate but still before
the House, and urged its passage there; pointed to railroad laws which
\
helped the interior of the country; noted that the state tax system
was being reviewed; and defended the tariff. 15
Meeting in Ogden on September 13, the Progressive State Convention was honored by the presence of Roosevelt, himself.

Enthusiastic

delegates from all over the state thronged to hear him.

Speaking from

an outdoor podium, he held the attention of some 6,000 listeners as he
restated his views and berated Utah delegates to the national convention
for taking part in the Chicago "theft." As an ex-President, he was well
received, although some of the listeners might not have agreed with
what he said,
14

IbldB, September 1, 1912,

15

Ibida, September 6, 1912.
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Later, the convention nominated Nephi L, Morris, Salt Lake
businesman, for Governor and Stephen H. Love, of Salt Lake County, and
Louis Larson of Sanpete for Congressman.

Love had earlier been consid-

ered for a similar post within the Republican ranks. Approval was given
to a platform much like that of the national party.

It called for

support of all the parent party's reform measures, both for national
and state improvements, and called down the Republicans in the state
for not doing what they had promised in the way of reform.

The longest

of the three, the Progressive platform was detailed and specific.16
William Jennings Bryan returned to Utah in September and spoke
in several towns on behalf of Wilson. As the campaign moved into the
final weeks, local politicians began stumping hard.

Prominent men

in all three parties spoke often and their attention was now divided
between the national candidates and those for state offices.
Bearing the brunt of a two-sided attack. Governor Spry and
the Republicans were accused of misuse of funds, collusion with the
railroads, extravagance in state offices, and illegal voting procedures,17

The Democrats especially pushed these charges, while the

Progressives assailed machine politics and Reed Smoot. The Republicans
stoutly defended themselves, while denying the fitness of either Morris
or Tolton to govern the state.
As the election day neared, doubt was expressed in the Tribune
about the outcome of the voting. An October 28 article reported:
16

Ibid,, September 14, 1912.

l7

These charges are explained in more detail on page 71 herein,
on this page below, and on the following page.
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Utah this week passes from the "safely Republican" to the "doubtful"
column. , a . The trend has been away from the Republican Party.
Indications still point to Republican success in the state, but the
signs are uncertain enough to justify placing the state in the
doubtful column. . , . 1 8
On November 2, an article claimed that "on the eve of the election the
situation in Utah is more in doubt than at any other time during the
campaign, „ . „ 19

It went on to say that while the Republicans would

probably win, the Democratic candidates for Congressman were in a strong
position. The November 3 Tribune carried four separate articles naming
Wilson as the probable winner nationally.
In a last ditch effort, the Democrats ran a full page ad in the
November 2 Deseret News and a similar one in the November 5 Tribune,
charging that the Republicans would probably try to commit fraud some
way or other—especially in connection with voting machines, to be used
that year for the first time.

(There had been ample explanation and

diagrams of their use in all the papers for days before the election.)
Other charges of misconduct were also made, including that of an
improper appeal to Church loyalty. The ads were headed, "Republicans
are making appeals to religious prejudice but there will be no investigation of a democratic state by a democratic national administration."
The night before the election, leaflets were distributed picturing
Smoot and others and asking for Mormon support for Taft. All sides
later denied knowledge of them, and it was decided that some individuals
had printed them to embarrass the Republicans,20 So went the campaign,
hard fought to the last dayf
18

Salt Lake Tribune, October 28, 1912.

19

Ibid,, November 2, 1912.
20
Ibid,, November 5-6, 1912.
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The post-election tabulation of votes showed that the Republicans
had again carried the state, but by a much smaller margin than in 1908.
Both Democrats and Republicans lost votes to the Progressives and to the
Socialist Party, which polled almost 9,000 votes. Taft had 42,013, or
37.4 per cent of the total. Wilson received 36,597, or 32.5 per cent;
and Roosevelt, 24,174, or 21.5 per cent. The votes for Governor and
Congressman did not vary greatly from these, as all the Republicans won.
(The Socialist state ticket also kept up with the national ticket, with
some 8,700 votes.)
Of the twenty-seven counties in the state, twenty were carried
by Taft, five by Wilson, and two by Roosevelt. Of the larger counties,
only Cache and Utah went for Wilson, with pluralities in each case of
about 400 votes; and only Weber went for Roosevelt, again by about 400
votes.

Table 3, on the following page, and Table 4, on page 95, show

how the voting went in each county.
There was no noticeable trend based on location, industry
(i.e., mining, agriculture, e t c ) , size of county, or other important
considerations—except that Roosevelt was markedly stronger in urban
areas, and Taft was somewhat more popular in rural areas.

It is diffi-

cult to say whether Utah, Cache, Weber, and Salt Lake counties may have
voted as they did because of actively partisan newspaper influence, or
whether newspapers with political bias prospered in those areas because
of the sympathetic political climate already established.

Did Weber,

for instance, vote Progressive because of the Standard, or was the
Standard able to be so outspokenly Progressive because the people felt
the same way?

In any event, the voting in areas of strong-minded news-

papers seemed to follow the lead of those papers.

TABLE 3
UTAH 1912 VOTE CAST FOR GOVERNOR AND FOR REPRESENTATIVES TO CONGRESS, BY COUNTIES*

Republican
William
Spry
Beaver
Box Elder
2ache
Carbon
)avls
Lmery
3arfield
?rand
[ron

Fuab

862
1, 282

859
596
236
656
1,168

Cane
dillard
Morgan
^iute
Jich
Salt Lake
San Juan
Sanpete
Sevier
Summit
Cooele
Jintah
Jtah
Wasatch
Washington
Wayne
Weber
Totals
a

Dp

432
1,404
2,849

395
847
323
175
326

Governor
Socialist
Democrat
John F.
Homer P.
Tolton
Burt

84
58
129
338
20
181
23
37
83
803
5
96
43
75
5

Progressive
Nephi L.
Morris

Republicans
HowellJohnson

990

185

689

1,371
3,158

1,190
1,275

1,588
2,337

218
149
245

471
477
224
107
85
37
330
7
249
278
113
99

793

446
1,135

759
339
214
505
970
151
1,084

Representatives
Socialists
Democrats
JohnsonKnerrKing
Thomas

438
969
330
198
336

99
51
125
345
18
190
21
36
97
810
5
112
39
7S
5

1,336

802
726
200
704
1,171

Progressives
LoveLarson

303
809

605
1,447
3,289

1,057

111
249
224
545
964
124
876
242
103
237

486
371
250
95
91
47
307
12
290
256
125
94
8,809

472
1,158

13,592

3,805

9,745

8,657

13,003

3,831

10,297

155

154

55

183

54

2,032

1,380

2,003

1,218

902
957
619
564

858
391
224
644

2,483
1,465
1,305

926
650
559

708
351
225
527

4,374

2,441

4,556

2,203

924
833
200

373
47
22

920
839
186

359
54
22

2,917

3,370

3,484

3
165
277
220
273
161
652
287
5
54
962

164

3,424

3
164
259
215
277
157
635
281
5
53
960

3,196

3,114

4 Z , O<JA

8,797

36,076

23,590

43,133

8,958

36,640

22,358

2,312
1,351
1,328
1,006

547
4,170
1,252

739
266

959
551
4,258
1,270

722
283

1,011
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TABLE 4
UTAH 1912 VOTE CAST FOR PRESIDENT, BY COUNTIES*

Counties

Beaver
Box Elder
Cache
Carbon
Davis
Emery
Garfield
Grand
Iron
Juab
Kane
Millard
Morgan
Piute
Rich
Salt Lake
San Juan
Sanpete
Sevier
Summit
Tooele
Uintah
Utah
Washington
Wasatch
Wayne
Weber

Totals

Republican
W, H0
Taft

672*
1,648*
2,821
783*
1, 283
762*
673*

190
690
1,167*
429*
970*
318*
206*
328*
12,691*

145
2,489*
1,451*
1,294*
950*

544
4,175

712
1,191*
283*
3,148

42,013

a

Socialist
E, V,
Debs

106
75
132
350
20
190
23
45
94
803
5
124
44
87
5
3,792

4
171
286
226
282
165
666
6
288
53
957
8,999

Democrat
Woodrow
VWilson

502
1,402
3,295*

514
1,142

760
249
212*

544
985
115
865
233
110
238
10,468
146*
1,984

915
983
646
566
4,636*
842*

957
183
2,986

36,579

Progressive
Theodore
Roosevelt

307
935

i,m

541
450
335
128
18
63
344
20
397
273
146
100

8,899

96
1,272

807
425
261
641*
2,295

72
432
24
3,608*

24,174

State of Utah, First Annual Report of the State Bureau of
Immigration, Labor, and Statistics;, 1911-1912, p. 312.
The winner in each county,

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS
President Taft won the election in Utah for several reasons.
First, there was little, if any, dissatisfaction with the economic condition of the state. Crops were good, prices high, and jobs plentiful.
The state had prospered during Taft's administration, and morale was
high. People were generally optimistic and apparently had no economic
reason for wanting a change of president.
Second, a good many Utahns received most of their campaign
information from Republican-oriented newspapers. Mormon and non-Mormon
papers alike actively supported Taft and just as actively opposed
Wilson and Roosevelt, No very large papers supported either of the
latter two, and only two or three of the smaller ones did. Such onesided newspaper support probably did not exist in the larger western
states, although it may have in the smaller ones,
Weber County, which favored Roosevelt, and Utah and Cache
counties, which favored Wilson, had a total population in 1912 of about
96,000.

(These were the only counties having active anti-Taft papers

and only one of the three was a daily,) Subtracting this figure from
the total population of the state, 373,000, leaves a balance of
277,000, or about 74 per cent of the population (living in Salt Lake
County and the smaller, primarily rural counties) which received the
bulk, if not all of as much campaign writing as it saw in the columns
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of pro-Taft papers. Also, while it is doubtful that very many people
outside the three counties named had access to the anti-Taft papers,
it is known that pro-Taft papers were readily obtainable in those three.
Weber and Utah counties, too, had pro-Taft papers of their own.
Third, Utah voters were told endlessly that tariff protection
was vital to Utah industry.

Many of them depended on sugar, mining,

or wool for a livelihood and even those who did not, stood to benefit
from taxes paid by those concerns to the state. President Taft proved
throughout the campaign his friendship for protection, and—by extension—
for Utah,
Why was there no consumer demand for a lower tariff? There was,
but it was weak, Utahns were less dependent as a whole on manufactured
goods than were their counterparts in the East and in some VWestern areas.
Nearly 54 per cent of the population still lived in towns of fewer than
4,000 inhabitants or on farms. Less than 25 per cent lived in towns of
more than 10,000, As suggested earlier, many who were not farmers worked
in the industries being protected.
Fourth, Utah was a Republican state (as were most of its neighbors),
having shown its preference in presidential and state elections since
1900, Republican party leaders worked from a position of strength with
the prestige of their national and state offices behind them. Having
been successful for some ten years, the party organization entered the
campaign strong and practiced in winning. The top party man. Reed Smoot,
was well known and popular in the State.
The Republicans won more than 50 per cent of the votes in 1900,
51 per cent in 1904, and 56 per cent in 1908. Whatever the cause for
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their initial Republican vote, it seems likely that many Utahns voted
Republican in 1912 because they had done so before.

It was their party.

Particularly in the absence of any real reason for changing was this apt
to be the case. Even with the party split, these earlier Republicans
sided in 1912 with either the Republican or the ex-Republican, rather
than supporting the Democrat. Taft and Roosevelt together received
nearly 59 per cent of the total, compared with 32 per cent for Wilson.
Especially in the twenty-three smaller counties did the voters remain
faithful, giving Taft 41.4 per cent of the vote, compared to 34.5 per
cent in the four larger counties. Wilson did almost equally well in
both areas, but Roosevelt did substantially better in the larger
counties (24,3 per cent to 17,5 per cent).
Fifth, Taft gained and Roosevelt lost votes because of sentiment
against a third party.

Republicans who would have liked to vote for

Roosevelt refrained from doing so because of party loyalty.

As men-

tioned earlier, Taft and Roosevelt picked up nearly twice as many
votes as VWilson, Had either of them received all the party votes, it
would have been no contest. As it was, Roosevelt had to draw his
support mostly from within the party, and the fact that he was splitting
the party hurt him. Roosevelt may also have taken some votes from
Wilson, which in turn helped Taft.
Sixth, the strength of the Socialist Party was a determining
factor in the outcome. Polling nearly 9,000 votes, it represented considerably more than the difference between Taft and Wilson (5,434 votes),
It is doubtful that in the absence of a Socialist Party many of those

1

Su£ra, p. 71.
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votes would have gone to Taft, The nature of the Socialist philosophy
would more likely have led its partisans to the Democratic or Progressive parties.

If Wilson could have received the 9,000 votes, or even

slightly more than half of them, he could have beaten Taft,
Seventh, the fact that Utah was largely rural, with more than
35 per cent of its population in Salt Lake County and another 19 per
cent in neighboring Utah and Weber counties, worked to the advantage of
the Republicans, Had there been several major population centers in the
state instead of just one, state control would have been harder to
achieve.

In other words, had Cache County—with its Democrat edge-

been of a size with Salt Lake City or Salt Lake County, it might have
canceled out the Republican edge in the latter. Or if Utah or Weber
counties had been in Southern Utah, away from the watchful eye of the
Republican central headquarters, perhaps their trends toward the
Democrats and the Progressives, respectively, would have been more
pronounced.

And again, had they compared somewhat in size with Salt

Lake, the outcome might have been different. As it was, nearly half
the population was within easy reach of the Republicans, and the rest
was so scattered as to not be readily accessible to anyone.

(Of course,

the other parties faced the same situation; but the Republicans, already
in control in the state, stood to profit more from it than their
opponents,)
Eighth, when President Joseph F. Smith, of the Mormon Church,
announced for Taft, even though he labeled it his opinion, he undoubtedly
swung some votes to Taft, Certainly Taft's prestige in Utah was enhanced
by the support of such an important person. How many votes were affected
cannot be calculated, but this writer believes they were fewer than has
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been thought in the past. The way had been left open for Mormons to
vote as they pleased, and important Church leaders belonged to all three
parties. As indicated in Chapter VI, large numbers of Mormons disregarded the presidents counsel at the critical moment.

It is doubtful,

then, that very many Democrats changed their vote to Taft; and Roosevelt
certainly received Mormon votes. Undecided Mormons and very probably
a few extremely conscientious ones may have followed the president's
lead.
It is this writer's opinion that President Smith's remarks and
those of other pro-Taft churchmen, rather than causing voters to change
their minds, only confirmed them in doing what they had decided to do
already. As explained in the various chapters, there were several
reasons why Utahns should have been expected to elect Taft independent
of any Church action. The opinions of the Church leaders, expressed
as they were rather late in the campaign, could hardly have been a
primary factor in the decisions of very many voters. Had those opinions
had a very great effect, the plurality for Taft should have been much
higher.
It is conceded that many Republicans who voted in 1912 may have
aligned themselves with that party originally in earlier campaigns at
the request of the Church, or for other reasons having to do with the
Church, To the extent that they continued to be Republicans, the
Church can be said to have influenced the vote. However, in 1912 the
Mormon-Republican vote was predominantly based on other considerations
than the comments of Church leaders.
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Thus the concerted effects of numerous forces in the state were
needed to bring about the Taft victory.

No one of them can be given all

the credit, nor can the credit be distributed among them with any degree of accuracy. Yet so narrow was the margin of victory, that it
appears that a substantial change in any of them might have altered the
outcome.
In view of the barrage of pro-Taft propaganda, a proper question
would seem to be: Why did Taft not win by a larger margin?

The answer

is the Progressive Party. The Democrats lost 6.5 per cent of their
1908 vote to either the Socialists or the Progressives, or both.
(Possibly some had been converted to Taft.) The Republicans lost 18.8
per cent of their 1908 vote, nearly all of which probably went to the
Progressives. As a liked and respected ex-President, Roosevelt had
appeal for many Republicans who willingly followed him out of the party.
He also appealed- to the more progressive element of the party who saw
no chance in Taft of getting what they sought. Without the Progressive
Party, Taft would surely have done much better than he did.
Although Taft did'have a plurality in the election of 5,434 votes,
the over-all figures indicated keen interest in progressivism within the
state. Wilson, Roosevelt, and the Socialists combined received 70,262
votes—28,249 more than Taft—so that in spite of the Taft victory,
Utah followed the national trend.

One is led to speculate that if

Roosevelt had run on the Republican ticket, he would have drawn 50 per
cent or more of the Utah vote,

(He would have had all of the Taft

advantages, plus his own appeal as a progressive.)
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None of Utah's neighbors in the West voted as she did, even
though some of them had some of the same problems. The answer again
seems to lie in the popularity of the Progressive Party, To explain
why that party was popular would require a study of conditions in each
state concerned. Suffice it to say that in every one of the ten other
Western states except Arizona, the Progressives and Republicans together
outpolled the Democrats—often by sizeable amounts—although the
Democrats carried all but two (California and Washington were carried
by Roosevelt).

Arizona and New Mexico voted for the first time as

states, and both went Democratic, The Progressives were a poor second
in Arizona and a poor third in New Mexico. California, strongly
Republican in 1908, went to the Progressives by a handful of votes
(283,610 to 283,435 for the Democrats). The Republicans won fewer
than 4,000, while the Socialists received 79,201. This can, in part,
be explained by the fact that the popular Governor Hyrum Johnson was
running for Vice-President on the Progressive ticket, Colorado, in the
Democrat column in 1908, remained there in 1912, but by a reduced margin-

The Republicans, who had run close in 1908, lost heavily to the

Progressives,

Idaho went to the Democrats by a thousand votes, although

they polled fewer votes than in 1908 when they lost, Montana was
Republican by 3,000 votes in 1908; Democratic in 1912 by nearly 10,000.
The Progressives had 22,456, Nevada remained Democratic in 1912, although
both the old parties lost heavily to the Progressives. Wyoming moved
narrowly into the Democratic ranks, after being strongly Republican the
previous election, Oregon went to the Democrats, and the Progressives
beat out the Republicans there.

In Washington, the Progressives ran a

strong first, with the Democrats second.
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In four of these states where the Democrats won, they polled
fewer votes than in 1908, in spite of a larger total vote.

In two,

where the Democrats won, and in one (Washington) which the Progressives
carried, the Democratic increase over 1908 was less than their proportionate share of the total increase of votes cast. Only in California
did the Democratic per cent of increase equal or pass the per cent of
increase in total votes, and this was not enough to win for them.
Table 5 on the following page shows the relative votes cast in
1908 and 1912 in the eleven Western states. These figures indicate
that it was not an Increase in the Democratic vote, but in most cases
a diminution of the Republican vote caused by strong Progressive inroads, that led to Wilson's victory in the West, Because of the reasons
listed earlier, Utah Republicans were more successful in holding their
ranks intact than were their fellows in the states around them. Thus
Utah became the only Republican state outside of New England adding
her four electoral votes to the four of Vermont in a futile endorsement
of William Howard Taft.

TABLE 5
VOTES RECEIVED IN 1908 AND 1912 IN THE ELEVEN WESTERN STATES BY MAJOR PARTIES3

State

Republicans
—

Arizona

1908
Democrats

Total

—

__

Republicans

1915i
Progressives
Democrats

Total

3,021

10,324

6,949

23,722

California

214,398

127,492

386,597

3,914

283,436

283,510

673,527

Colorado

123,700

126,644

253,877

58,386

114,232

72,306

266,880

Idaho

52,621

36.162

97,288

32.810

33,921

25,527

105,755

Montana

32.333

29,326

58,822

18,512

27.941

22,456

79,826

Nevada

10,775

11,212

24,526

3,196

7.986

5,520

20,115

Wyoming

20,846

14,918

37,509

14,560

15,310

9,232

42,295

—

—

—

17,900

22,139

8,347

51,245

62,530

38,049

110,889

34,673

47,054

37,600

137,040

106,062

58,691

183,879

70,445

85,840

113,698

322,799

61,028

42,601

108,611

42,100

35,579

24,174

112,275

New Mexico
Oregon
Washington

Utah
a

U. S., Statistical Abstract:, 1912, p. 733.
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ABSTRACT
The year 1912 was an unusual political year because of the
development of an important third party, the Progressives, Theodore
Roosevelt returned from abroad to find his reform program lagging
under the Taft Administration and decided to run for the presidency
himself. His announcement of intent to run and subsequent bolt from
the Chicago convention split the Republican Party into two belligerant
factions. Taft claimed to be progressive enough and had the support
of the regular party members, Roosevelt was nominated for President
by his supporters and formed the "Bull Moose" Progressive Party. The
Democrats had also adopted a progressive program and then nominated
Woodrow Wilson, reform-minded Governor of New Jersey for President.
The three-way race was bitterly contested, but the split among the
Republicans handed the victory to Wilson,
In Utah the campaign was followed closely.

For several impoi-

tant reasons, the people of Utah had voted Republican with regularity
since 1900 and the governorship and Congressional posts were held by
Republicans in 1912. The most powerful political figure in Utah was
Reed Smoot, United States Senator and Apostle in the Mormon Church.
Under his direction, the G.O.P, was able to retain control of the state
in spite of deep inroads made by the Progressives,
For Utahns the issues were:

(1) The candidates themselves;

Each was described in detail as to his beliefs and his past record and
the likelihood of his helping Utah, Both Taft and Roosevelt were

2
claimed as past friends of Utah. Wilson was little known.

(2) The

Tariff: Most Utahns seemed anxious to have the tariff kept high.
When Taft vetoed two tariff-lowering bills in succession and one died
when the Senate and House refused to compromise, the people of the
state were pleased.

(3) "Bossism":

The Democrats and Progressives

assailed Reed Smoot as being a boss as bad as any and of engaging in
"machine" politics.

(4) Corruption and extravagance in the state

government; Governor William Spry was criticized for being too easy
on the railroads and for misuse of state funds,

(5) Church "inter-

ference": A month before the election. President Joseph F. Smith
stated in an Improvement Era editorial that he favored Taft. The
resulting furor had not died out by election day.
The press in Utah was almost entirely pro-Taft. The other
candidates received fairly full, though less flattering, coverage. The
editorials were decidedly in Taft's favor, and little good was said *
about the others. The bulk of the Utah population had to follow the
campaign from a pro-Taft point of view.
The campaigning in Utah began slowly, but gained momentum as the
fall approached.

In the closing days, party leaders stumped hard and

rallies were held frequently.
The reasons for the Taft victory were;

(1) A favorable economy

and optimism for the future,

(2) A preponderance of pro-Taft newspaper

reporting and editorializing.

(3) The belief that a high tariff, which

Taft favored, was necessary to the Utah economy,

(4) Utah had a ten-

year tradition of Republicanism, and the party was strong.

(5) Many

Utahns were opposed to the splitting of the Republican Party which

Roosevelt was causing.

(6) The Socialists had a strong vote, almost

double the difference between Taft and Wilson, Had those votes gone
to Wilson, he would have won.

(7) Utah was largely rural, giving the

party in power an advantage.

(8) The expressed preference of Joseph F.

Smith for Taft brought some voters to support him.
The reason Taft's margin of victory was not greater was that the
Progressive Party hurt the Republicans much more than it did the
Democrats•
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